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INTRODUCTION
“They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”
—Benjamin Franklin (Inscribed on the pedestal
of the Statue of Liberty)

One day after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the
United States, President George W. Bush vowed that “we will not
allow this enemy to win the war by changing our way of life or
1
restricting our freedoms.” Yet within several months following the
attacks, it became increasingly evident that the “War on Terrorism”
was evolving into a reshaping of our national security policies and
challenging the value that Americans have always placed on civil
liberties. While Congress’ anti-terrorism law, the so-called Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
2
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (“Patriot Act”) may
not have been designed to restrict American citizens’ civil liberties, its
unintended consequences threaten the fundamental constitutional
rights of people who have absolutely no involvement with terrorism.
Americans’ liberties have been trammeled in a variety of different
ways. Under the guise of stopping terrorism, law enforcement
officials and government leaders have now been given the right to
3
conduct searches of homes and offices without prior notice, use
4
roving wiretaps to listen in on telephone conversations, and monitor
computers and e-mail messages, even to the degree of eavesdropping
5
on attorney/client conversations. In addition, the President has
made efforts to bring suspected terrorists into military tribunals for
6
prosecution. Finally, a growing sentiment for the establishment of a

1. After the Attacks: Bush’s Remarks to Cabinet and Advisers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2001, at A16.
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
3. See id. § 213, 115 Stat. at 285-86 (allowing issuance of warrants with delayed
notice to suspected individuals if there is reasonable cause to believe that notification
would have an adverse effect on the attempted law enforcement effort).
4. See id. §§ 206-207, 115 Stat. at 282 (amending the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 to allow more expansive protection of secrecy for those
carrying out electronic surveillance).
5. See id. §§ 201-204, 115 Stat. at 278-81 (providing for enhanced surveillance
procedures).
6. Alison Mitchell, Cheney Rejects Broader Access to Terror Brief, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2002, at A1.
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national identification card system in the United States has emerged,
7
threatening to force all citizens to be “tagged.”
For the sake of greater security in this post-September 11th climate,
many Americans have expressed the willingness to relinquish some of
8
their freedoms. This readiness is somewhat understandable in light
9
of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
10
the anthrax scare, and the resulting exhaustive coverage that the
media has afforded these events. However, Americans must be
mindful that while the security of husbands, wives, children, and
friends may be worth some limitations placed on American freedoms,
even small infringements, over time, may become major
compromises that alter this country’s way of life.
The clash between civil liberties and national security is not a new
one, and history demonstrates that, in times of war, the courts—even

7. Jennifer Lee, Upgraded Driver’s Licenses Are Urged as National IDs, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2002, at A13; Robert O’Harrow, Jr., States Seek National ID Funds: Motor Vehicle
Group Backs High-Tech Driver’s Licenses, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2002, at A4; Robert
O’Harrow Jr. & Jonathan Krim, National ID Card Gaining Support, WASH. POST, Dec.
17, 2001, at A1; Robert O’Harrow Jr., States Devising Plan for High-Tech National
Identification Cards, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2001, at A10; New Driver’s Licenses Study
Underway, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 8, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
aponline/technology/AP-Identity-Cards.html.
8. In an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll, seventy-eight percent of those
polled stated they would accept new security laws, even if it meant fewer privacy
protections, and seventy-eight percent stated they would support surveillance of
Internet communications. NBC News/Wall Street Journal: 72% Say U.S. Is Moving in
the Right Direction, THE HOTLINE, Sept. 17, 2001. Congressional leaders from both
parties have articulated this sentiment. House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt
(D-Mo.) stated two days after the attacks, “[w]e’re in a new world where we have to
rebalance freedom and security.” Eric Pianin & Thomas B. Edsau, Terrorism Bills
Revive Civil Liberties Debate, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at A16. Senate Minority
Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) echoed this sentiment, stating, “when you’re at war, civil
liberties are treated differently.” Id.
9. Don Van Natta & Lizette Alvarez, A Day of Terror: Attack on Military, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A5.
10. Numerous incidents of cutaneous and inhalation anthrax illness, apparently
contracted primarily as a result of exposure through the mail, occurred in diverse
locations throughout October and November of 2001, shortly after the September
11th terrorist attacks. These incidents were reported chiefly at print and television
media locations, post office facilities, and the U.S. Capitol. See generally Florida Man
Dies After Contracting Rare Form of Anthrax, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 5, 2001, available at
http://www.newstribune.com/stories/100601wor1006010029.asp; Officials: Tests Show
Presence of Anthrax in Second Florida Man and at Newspaper Building, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Oct. 8, 2001, available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/anthraxfla
011008.html; Anthrax Cases, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 13, 2001 (“New Yorkers streamed
into emergency rooms after an assistant to [NBC News anchor Tom] Brokaw was
infected with anthrax, intensifying fear about bioterrorism in a city and nation
already on edge”), available at http://thehonoluluadvertiser.com/2001/Oct/13/
In/Intoa.html; 32,000 Took Medicine as Anthrax Safeguard, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2001,
at A10; Spores Found in More Congressional Offices, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2001, at A13;
Fourth Letter Discovered by FBI: Envelope Addressed to Senator Leahy, Found in Quarantined
Mail, Similar ‘In Every Respect’ to Others, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2001, at A1.
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the United States Supreme Court—have upheld restrictive laws that
11
abridge rights otherwise protected by the Constitution.
Unfortunately, history repeats itself. Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist has consistently recognized that times of questionable
international safety may impact the American stance on its domestic
freedoms. Rehnquist has written, “It is neither desirable nor is it
remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a position in
12
wartime as it does in peacetime.” The United States is now at war,
and the protection of civil liberties may become less of a priority.
Americans should not underestimate the impact that such
reprioritizing will have in the long run. Whatever the outcome of the
undeclared “War on Terrorism,” Americans should not labor under
the misconception that freedoms forsaken today might somehow be
regained tomorrow. Unlike previous wars, this time, enemies may
not reach a truce which would signal the return of civil liberties.
13
With or without sunset clauses, there is no horizon for recapturing
any freedoms relinquished today.
The U.S. Constitution, if
compromised now, may never again be the same. In today’s world,
once civil liberties are fenced, they may never be freed, becoming
captive to the warden of national security.
Yet the ultimate outcome, at least for now, is perhaps less
important than understanding that Americans are operating in a new
paradigm. Concerns for security and freedom will always conflict to
some degree. Therefore, Americans must understand that this is a
new kind of “War on Terrorism,” with no immediate end in sight, and

11. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), is perhaps the most notorious
example. Korematsu upheld the conviction of a Japanese-American citizen for
violating an exclusionary order and determined that the order was justified by the
exigencies of the war and the perceived threat to national defense and safety. Id. at
223. After the war, it became clear that Japanese-American citizens had not posed
any significant threat to the nation. In fact, Japanese-American soldiers were among
the most highly decorated in the American war effort. A combat battalion consisting
of Japanese-American soldiers, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team was highly
effective in the Southern European Campaign, and its members included twenty
Congressional Medal of Honor recipients and fifty-two Distinguished Service Crosses.
See Research on 100th/442nd Regimental Combat Team, National JapaneseAmerican Historical Society, at http://nikkeiheritage.org/research/hh2.html. Also
notorious from the First World War era are United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social
Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921), which upheld the
revocation of a socialist newspaper’s second-class mailing privileges for anti-war
speech that would be labeled as core protected political speech today, and Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919), which ruled against a First Amendment
challenge to a conviction for conspiracy to distribute a circular denouncing
conscription “in impassioned terms.”
12. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 224 (1998).
13. A sunset provision is a legislative control that specifies the lifetime of a piece
of legislation or, most typically, an agency. WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 44 (4th ed. 2000).
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that it is also a new kind of challenge to civil liberties. Thus, it is
time for a fundamental rethinking of what U.S. citizens consider
basic freedoms. Americans may decide that certain freedoms,
especially those guaranteed in the United States Constitution, are
simply too precious to sacrifice at any cost, even on the altar of
security.
I.

OVERVIEW: THE NEWLY-CREATED LEGAL FRAMEWORK

On September 14, 2001, in response to the September 11th attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W.
15
16
Bush declared a state of emergency, invoking presidential powers.
The Proclamation was issued because of the terrorist attacks and the
“continuing and immediate threat of future attacks on the United
17
States.” The Order provides important powers, such as the authority
18
to summon reserve troops and marshal military units.
From the outset, the Bush Administration has chosen to view the
attacks as acts of war by foreign aggressors, rather than as criminal
19
acts that require redress by the justice system. Two weeks after the
attacks, the nation’s chief law enforcement officer, Attorney General
John Ashcroft, submitted written testimony to the Senate Judiciary
Committee on behalf of President Bush and asked Congress for
broad new powers to enable the Administration to conduct its “War
20
on Terrorism.” In later testimony, Ashcroft stated that the
Department of Justice’s mission was redefined, placing the defense of
21
the nation and its citizens above all else. This historic “redefinition”

14. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (outlining how the Patriot Act has
increased the authority of law enforcement officials and resulted in the infringement
of civil liberties).
15. Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001).
16. The President may only utilize those powers and authorities made available
in national emergencies specifically cited within the proclamation or a subsequent
published executive order. 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994).
17. Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199.
18. See id. (declaring the intent of the President to utilize, inter alia, 14 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1994), which allows the Secretary to order any regular officer on the retired
list to duty and 10 U.S.C. § 12302 (1998), which provides for the creation of the
“ready reserves”).
19. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (documenting the active role
taken by the President in combating terrorism); see also infra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text (discussing the congressional involvement in the fight).
20. Homeland Defense Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001)
(Sept. 25, 2001) [hereinafter Homeland Defense Testimony] (written testimony of the
Honorable John Ashcroft, Attorney General), available at http://www.senate.gov~
judiciary/print _testimony. cfm?id= 108&wit_id=42.
21. DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (Dec. 6, 2001) [hereinafter DOJ
Oversight Testimony] (written statement of the Honorable John Ashcroft, Attorney
General), available at http://www.senate.gov/%7Ejudiciary/print_testimony.cfm?id=
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of the Justice Department’s mission turned the focus of federal law
enforcement from apprehending and incarcerating criminals to
detecting and halting terrorist activity on American soil and abroad.
Ashcroft’s written statement to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary emphasized that the attacks presented a new challenge for
law enforcement officials, due to their occurrence on American soil,
and stated that, in light of this, America cannot wait to take
precautionary actions, as “[w]e must prevent first, prosecute
22
second.”
Ashcroft reiterated to the Senate this new emphasis on
“prevention” over prosecution, directing the DOJ, at the President’s
request, toward one single, over-arching and overriding objective: “to
23
save innocent lives from further acts of terrorism.” Ashcroft testified
that the DOJ, as well as the FBI, was undergoing “a wartime
reorganization” that focused its efforts on the prevention of
24
terrorism.
Whatever practical wisdom the adoption of this martial mindset
may hold for preventing similar attacks in the future, its ramifications
for the civil rights of American citizens and resident non-citizens are
becoming increasingly evident. Congress passed the Patriot Act in
response to the Bush Administration’s request for “the tools” to fight
25
terrorism. This Act is only the phalanx of a broad new set of
operating procedures adopted by federal law enforcement agencies,
procedures which demonstrate a reassessment by the Bush
Administration—and perhaps the American public itself—of the
political expediency of maintaining a commitment to certain
established civil and constitutional rights. Some measures, such as
the Patriot Act, were politically driven by both the executive and
26
legislative branches, and were well publicized. Others have been
quietly ushered in as executive orders or agency operating
procedures. Regardless of the manner of execution, it is clear that all
of these measures will have a significant impact on the American
views of civil liberties enshrined in the Constitution and the
traditional functioning of the government.

121&wit_id=42.
22. Homeland Defense Testimony, supra note 20.
23. DOJ Oversight Testimony, supra note 21.
24. Id.
25. Homeland Defense Testimony, supra note 20.
26. The meteoric passage of the Patriot Act is remarkable. H.R. 3162 was
introduced in the House of Representatives on October 23, 2001. Pursuant to a rule
waiver, it was passed the next day by a vote of 357-to-66. The Senate approved the bill
without amendment by a vote of 98-to-1 on October 26th, and it was signed into law
the same day by President Bush.
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A. Centralization of Law Enforcement Powers in the Justice Department
In order to empower the Department of Justice, Congress passed
the Patriot Act on October 26, 2001, and President Bush signed it
27
into law the next day. The Act is exceedingly long and complex,
comprising ten-parts and over 300 pages. Therefore, the subsequent
analysis in this article will focus only on certain provisions of the Act
that are particularly troubling for their potential impact on civil
liberties and constitutional freedoms.
The Justice Department has warned that it will use its new authority
under the Patriot Act to the maximum. Exemplifying this intent,
Attorney General Ashcroft stated:
Within hours of passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, we made use of
its provisions to begin enhanced information sharing between the
law-enforcement and intelligence communities. We have used the
provisions allowing nationwide search warrants for e-mail and
subpoenas for payment information. And we have used the Act to
place those who access the Internet through cable companies on
28
the same footing as everyone else.

Ashcroft then described the Justice Department’s response to the
September 11th attacks as “the largest, most comprehensive criminal
29
investigation in world history.”
Ashcroft reported that, as of
mid-December 2001, the government was utilizing 4,000 FBI agents
30
to investigate terrorism.
The Patriot Act’s centralization of federal law enforcement
authority in the Justice Department has significantly empowered this
massive investigation. Section 808 of the Act reassigns the authority
for investigating numerous federal crimes of violence from other
federal law enforcement agencies—such as the Secret Service, the
31
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Coast Guard—to
the Attorney General, thus adding to his authority for investigating
32
“all federal crimes of terrorism.” These new areas of investigation
33
include assault against specified federal high office holders; threats
of homicide, assault, intimidation, property damage, arson, or
34
35
bombing; arson or bombing of federal property; conspiracy to

27. J.M. Lawrence, War on Terrorism: Anti-Terror Laws in Place, BOSTON HERALD,
Oct. 27, 2001, at 5.
28. DOJ Oversight Testimony, supra note 21.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. This group is organized under the Treasury Department.
32. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 808, 115 Stat. 272, 378-79 (2001).
33. Id. § 808 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2332b with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 351(e)).
34. Id. (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2332b with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 844(e)).
35. Id. (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2332b with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1)).
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36

destroy property of a foreign government; malicious mischief
37
against United States government property; destruction of property
38
of an energy utility; assault against presidential or White House
39
40
officials; sabotage of harbor defenses; and sabotage of war industry
41
facilities. In essence, to combat terrorism, Congress has granted the
Attorney General the power to investigate not only acts of terrorism
but most acts of violence against public officers and property.
Additionally, the Justice Department’s new authority appears to
extend beyond its traditional geographical limitation—the national
borders—in two ways. First, Justice’s terrorism initiatives are being
conducted multilaterally. The Attorney General has said that
agencies under his direction, including the FBI, are “engaged with
their international counterparts” in Europe and the Middle East in
42
investigating terrorists.
Second, Justice’s subject matter of
investigation has been extended to cover the flow of foreigners into
the United States. The Bush Administration appears determined to
assign control over lawful entry into the United States, a monitoring
function of the State Department, to the Justice Department.
Regarding this transition, Ashcroft stated: “Working with the State
Department, we have imposed new screening requirements on
43
certain applicants for non-immigrant visas.”
He continued,
explaining that, “[a]t the direction of the President, we have created
a Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to ensure that we do
everything we can to prevent terrorists from entering the country,
44
and to locate and remove those who already have.” The extent to
which these executive branch powers have been consolidated in one
45
official, the Attorney General, is unprecedented in recent history.

36. Id. (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2332b with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 956(b)).
37. Id. (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2332b with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 1361).
38. Id. (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2332b with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 1366(b) and
(c)).
39. Id. (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2332b with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 1751(e)).
40. Id. (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2332b with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 2152).
41. Id. (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2332b with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 2156).
42. DOJ Oversight Testimony, supra note 21.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The administration’s centralization of authority and resistance to
accountability bring to mind James Madison’s words in The Federalist No. 51.
Addressing the inherent tension between liberty and authority in democratic
governments, Madison wrote:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the Government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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The Administration has made further efforts to consolidate power
over the “War on Terrorism” into the Executive branch by displaying
resistance to congressional oversight of its new powers. For example,
section 904 of the Patriot Act allowed the Secretary of Defense, the
Attorney General, and the Director of the CIA to defer the date for
submitting any required intelligence report to Congress until
February 1, 2002, or until a later specified date if they certified that it
would “impede the work of officers or employees who are engaged in
46
counterterrorism activities.” This provision effectively postponed
the statutory obligation imposed upon these public servants to report
to Congress regarding the “War on Terrorism,” on foreign or
domestic fronts, virtually indefinitely. Ashcroft echoed this resistance
47
to oversight in testimony before the Senate.
Although he
acknowledged his obligation to report on the Administration’s
48
activities, he also stated:
Congress’s power of oversight is not without limits . . . . In some
areas . . . I cannot and will not consult you . . . . I cannot and will
not divulge the contents, the context, or even the existence of such
advice to anyone—including Congress—unless the President
instructs me to do so. I cannot and will not divulge information,
nor do I believe that anyone here would wish me to divulge
information, that will damage the national security of the United
States, the safety of its citizens or our efforts to ensure the same in
49
an ongoing investigation.

In other words, the Administration has reserved to itself the right
to determine what information it will disclose to Congress in its
oversight role and what information it will withhold as sensitive.
B. CIA Oversight of Domestic Intelligence Gathering
At the same time that the Bush Administration has centralized
authority for international and domestic law enforcement in the
Justice Department, the Administration has used the Patriot Act to
transfer authority for coordinating domestic intelligence gathering
50
from the Justice Department to the Central Intelligence Agency.

46. USA Patriot Act § 904, 115 Stat. at 387-88.
47. See DOJ Oversight Testimony, supra note 21 (claiming that the President’s
authority is at least partially constitutionally founded).
48. Ashcroft noted that “America’s campaign to save innocent lives . . . has
brought me back to this committee to report to you in accordance with Congress’s
oversight role.” Id.
49. Id.
50. See USA Patriot Act § 901, 115 Stat. at 387 (limiting the CIA Director’s search
authority only to the extent that such searches are not “authorized by Statute or
Executive Order”).
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The Patriot Act added a new subsection to the statute, defining the
CIA Director’s authority to provide that the CIA Director will have
the power to set requirements and priorities in the collection of
foreign intelligence information under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 and “to provide assistance to the Attorney
General to ensure that information derived from electronic
surveillance or physical searches under that Act is disseminated so it
may be used efficiently and effectively for foreign intelligence
51
purposes . . . .”
This coordinating role was formerly taken by the Attorney General.
The Patriot Act has given the CIA the central authority to gather and
use intelligence information garnered from domestic sources,
including intelligence on United States citizens and residents. This
authority raises an inherent conflict with another section of the
statute that ostensibly limits the CIA’s authority, section 403-3(d)(1),
which provides that the CIA “shall have no police, subpoena, or law
52
enforcement powers or internal security functions.” By allowing the
CIA to take a prominent position over the Justice Department and
the FBI, this provision of the Patriot Act turns on its head existing
policy and practice that was established as a result of CIA abuses
during the Cold War era, and permits the CIA to begin, once again,
53
to spy on American citizens. Moreover, under the legislation, the
federal government has reserved the specific right to monitor
religious groups and charitable organizations as well, a practice that

51. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(c)(6) (Supp. 2002).
52. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(d)(1) (Supp. 2002).
53. The most notorious, but certainly not the only, example of the CIA’s abuse of
this monitoring power is that of “Operation CHAOS,” initiated in 1967 to monitor
U.S. citizens who protested against the Vietnam War. See generally Halkin v. Helms,
690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Hrones v.
CIA, 685 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1982); Nat’l Lawyers’ Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Grove Press, Inc. v. CIA, 483 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Ferry v.
CIA, 458 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Krause v. Rhodes, 535 F. Supp. 338 (N.D.
Ohio 1979); Socialist Workers’ Party v. Attorney Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y.
1986). CHAOS attempted to monitor the increasing influenc exerted over critics of
the Johnson Administration’s Vietnam policy by “Soviets, Chicoms [Chinese
Communists], Cubans and other Communist countries,” paying particular attention
to “any evidence of foreign direction, control, training or funding.” Halkin, 690 F.2d
at 982 n.8. See generally Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within
the United States (1975) (the Rockefeller Report); Final Report of the Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. REP. NO. 94-755, pt.
1, at 135-39. The CIA targeted certain groups, including “radical students, antiVietnam war activists, draft resisters and deserters, black nationalists, anarchists, and
assorted ‘New Leftists.’” Halkin, 690 F.2d at 982 n.9. It maintained several thousand
computerized files on Americans involved in these activities. Id. at 982. The CIA’s
activities ranged from infiltration and mail monitoring to inclusion of several dozen
Americans on a “watchlist,” which enabled the CIA to scan and intercept all
telecommunications containing references to those names. Id. at 983-84.
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has subjected federal law enforcement authorities to considerable
judicial scrutiny for its chilling effect on the right to free association
54
and worship under the First Amendment. The Patriot Act also gives
the CIA unprecedented access to a broad range of intelligence
gathering powers that allow information collection and monitoring
55
of American citizens.
C. Expanding the Scope of “Terrorism” and “Domestic Terrorism”
The Justice Department assures Americans that its new legal and
investigatory authority is “carefully drawn” to target only
56
“terrorists.”
At the same time that the Justice Department is
ostensibly targeting only this “narrow class of individuals,” it has
57
greatly expanded that class of suspects through the Patriot Act.
Section 802 of the Act amends the criminal code, 18 U.S.C. § 2331, to
add a new definition of “domestic terrorism” to include activities that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

54. John Solomon, Ashcroft: Groups Could be Monitored, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 2,
2001, available at 2001 WL 31031690; Susan Schmidt & Dan Eggen, FBI Given More
Latitude: New Surveillance Rules Remove Evidence Hurdle, WASH. POST, May 30, 2002, at
A1; John Solomon, U.S. Extremists, Terror Groups Eyed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 28, 2002
(discussing increased monitoring of U.S. extremist groups out of concern they may
try to coordinate with international terrorists); see, e.g., Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104
F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Fourth Amendment rights of clergy and
prisoners were violated by surreptitious taping of prison confessional); United States
v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989) (describing infiltration and extensive
monitoring of churches by INS officials investigating alleged alien smuggling).
55. For a description of how this inter-agency information gathering works, see
Jim McGee, In Federal Law Enforcement, ‘All Walls Are Down,’ WASH. POST, Oct. 14,
2001, at A16 (describing agents of FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, Customs, and others working
side-by-side in anti-terrorism headquarters of the FBI and CIA). See also Laurie
Kellman, Feds Link Anti-Terrorism Databases, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 11, 2002
(describing Attorney General’s plan to link databases of local, federal, and
international law enforcement authorities). The Attorney General’s rationale for
this expanded information gathering and sharing capability is similar in tone, if not
intent, to the Vietnam-era CIA’s rationale for citizen monitoring:
[L]aw enforcement needs a strengthened and streamlined ability for our
intelligence gathering agencies to gather the information necessary to
disrupt, weaken and eliminate the infrastructure of terrorist organizations.
Critically, we also need the authority for law enforcement to share vital
information with our national security agencies in order to prevent future
terrorist attacks.
Homeland Defense Testimony, supra note 20.
56. DOJ Oversight Testimony, supra note 21.
57. See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001) (providing,
inter alia, that violation of certain domestic criminal laws constitutes domestic
terrorism); see also infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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(ii) to influence the policy of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; or
(iii) to effect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
58
States.

Likewise, section 808 of the Patriot Act amends 18 U.S.C. § 2332b
to include any such acts that result in virtually any federal crime of
59
violence.
Conceivably, these extensions of the definition of
“terrorist” could bring within their sweep diverse domestic political
groups, which have been accused of acts of intimidation or property
damage such as Act Up, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
60
(PETA), Operation Rescue, and the Vieques demonstrators.
Cognizant of these criticisms and fears, the Attorney General
recently assured the Senate that the U.S. government’s definition of
terrorism has, since 1983, included as terrorists only “those who

58. USA Patriot Act § 802, 115 Stat. at 376.
59. Id. § 808. The Act’s amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3077 (1)(a) (2000), which
includes “domestic terrorism” within the rewards program provided by the Justice
Department for information relating to terrorist acts, further confirms that the
Justice Department will routinely employ this broader definition of “terrorism.” Id.
§ 802(b).
60. There is precedent for this expansive reading of anti-criminal legislation
against political protesters in the application of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994), to pro-life (antiabortion) protesters. RICO was passed with broad language designed to take the
profit out of organized crime. RICO makes it unlawful “for any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
the collection of an unlawful debt.” Id. § 1962(c). A “pattern” of RICO activity
occurs if two acts are committed within a ten-year span. Id. § 1961(5). In National
Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994), the Supreme Court
unanimously rejected several pro-life protesters’ argument that RICO could not
apply to them because they lacked an economic motivation to constitute an
“enterprise” under RICO. Although the majority did not address RICO’s potential
chilling effects upon free speech or associational rights, Justice Souter recognized in
a concurring opinion that the majority opinion does not preclude First Amendment
challenges to the application of RICO in certain situations. Id. at 262 n.6 (Souter, J.,
concurring). As one commentator noted after Scheidler, it would appear that “any
politically unpopular protest movement with resulting property damage or even
technical trespass can be elevated into a federal crime.” Angela Hubbell, ‘Face’ing the
First Amendment: Application of RICO and the Clinic Entrances Act to Abortion Protesters, 21
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1061, 1067 (1995); cf. Palmetto State Med. Ctr. v. Operation
Lifeline, 117 F.3d 142 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that no evidence existed to show that
Operation Lifeline or any of the individual defendants were engaged in any illegal
activities on the particular dates alleged by the plaintiff/hospital); Planned
Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Or. 1996)
(concluding that plaintiffs adequately stated RICO claims against all but one
defendant); Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, No. 86 C 788, 1997 WL 610782,
*30 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1997) (permitting certain RICO claims to proceed against
defendants while granting judgment in favor of defendants on other RICO claims).
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perpetrate premeditated, politically motivated violence against
61
noncombatant targets.” If that is true, it certainly begs the question
of why the Bush Administration felt the need to redefine “terrorism”
to include a wide variety of domestic criminal acts.
D. Disregard of the Constitutional Rights of Resident Non-Citizens
The Supreme Court has affirmatively held that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights of due process and access to a jury trial in
criminal matters apply to all “persons” and those accused in criminal
62
cases, respectively, not just to citizens.
In the case of lawfully
resident and temporary aliens, the Supreme Court has affirmed that
where such permanent alien residents remain “physically present” in
the United States, they are deemed “persons” for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment, and, as such, are entitled to due process
63
Therefore, “[a] lawful
protections of life, liberty, and property.
resident alien may not captiously be deprived of his constitutional
64
rights to due process.”
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that even the millions of
undocumented aliens living inside U.S. borders are entitled to the
65
protections of the Bill of Rights. This entitlement flows not only
from the broad reach of the Fifth Amendment, but also from
principles of equal protection of the law to which all those obeying
66
such laws are entitled. The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he
Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects
every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. Even one whose presence in
this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that
67
68
constitutional protection.”
For example, in Plyler v. Doe, the
Supreme Court held that a Texas public school district’s exclusion of
illegal immigrants from public education denied them equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

61. DOJ Oversight Testimony, supra note 21. The Attorney General apparently is
referring to former versions of the provisions cited above, which now employ broadly
expanded definitions of “terrorism” pursuant to the Patriot Act amendments.
62. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264-66 (1990).
63. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953).
64. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953) (citation
omitted).
65. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
66. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 n.11 (1982) (quoting Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 242-43 (1896) (Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
67. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77.
68. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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These constitutional protections also apply to the exclusion of
69
aliens within U.S. borders. The Supreme Court has clarified the
extent of constitutional protection by stating that, “once an alien
enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States,
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
70
temporary, or permanent.”
Accordingly, proceedings for the
expulsion of aliens must conform to fairness incorporated by due
71
process standards.
In view of the historical extension of constitutional protections to
all who reside within America’s borders, the seemingly intentional
disregard for the constitutional status of resident and temporary
aliens displayed in the Administration’s recent actions and certain
72
Several of the more
provisions of the Patriot Act is alarming.
egregious examples, such as suspension of the right to a jury trial,
infringements upon the right to counsel, and seizures of property
without due process, are discussed below. However, the lack of
concern for the rights of non-citizens runs thematically through the
Administration’s response to the terrorist attacks.


69. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2500 (2001) (citing Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)).
70. Id. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77, Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 596-98, and Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) also support the proposition that expulsion
cannot occur without adherence to the formalities of due process.
71. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
Constitutional due process protections are not extended to aliens who have not yet
entered the United States. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269
(1990), the Court stated that “[i]t is well established that certain constitutional
protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens
outside the territorial boundaries.”
Likewise, illegal aliens who have been
intercepted at the border and deemed “excludable” may be subjected to summary
exclusion without due process. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2500 (internal citations
omitted). Accordingly, this analysis does not address the application of the Patriot
Act or Justice Department actions with regard to excludable aliens.
72. The Administration’s characterization of aliens tends to shift with context.
They are defended as “Americans” when subject to retaliatory attacks and threats.
See, e.g., DOJ Oversight Testimony, supra note 21 (stating that the DOJ has investigated
over “250 incidents of retaliatory violence and threats against Arab Americans,
Muslim Americans, Sikh Americans and South Asian Americans”). On the other
hand, Ashcroft recently claimed that peaceful, productive aliens who held jobs at a
major airport despite their illegal status were a threat to citizens. See Greg Schneider,
Utah Airport Workers Indicted in Security Probe, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2001, at A16
(quoting Ashcroft as commenting that, “Americans who pass through our nation’s
airports and who travel on our nation’s airlines must and will be protected. The
Justice Department will enforce the law fully and vigorously to protect Americans.”).
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION
Much of the legislation enacted pursuant to the government’s
prosecution of the “War on Terrorism” has had a deleterious effect
on the sacrosanct protection of the First Amendment right to free
speech. The First Amendment precludes Congress from creating
laws that will abridge “the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
73
right of the people peaceably to assemble.”
The First Amendment encompasses the right to advocate ideas, to
speak freely, to associate with whomever one chooses, and to petition
74
Such activities are
the government for redress of grievances.
protected against blanket prohibitions and from restrictions based
upon government opposition to the content of the idea expressed, or
75
the identity of the speaker.
The First Amendment functions to
protect the “unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
76
political and social changes desired by the people.” The application
of the Amendment is not intended to be limited. Resident aliens and
undocumented aliens with substantial ties to the United States belong
to the national community and, as such, enjoy the rights afforded by
77
the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to a “profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
78
on government and public officials.” The right to free speech serves
not only to protect the rights of the speaker but also to uphold the
general public’s interest in having access to information within a free
79
flowing marketplace of ideas.
The Court has stressed the
importance of this fact, noting the power of discussion to expose
falsehoods, and stating that “[t]hose who won our independence had
confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and

73. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
74. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding that
a distinction between peaceful labor picketers and peaceful picketers is
impermissible); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding that content-based
restrictions on political speech must be shown to be necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that end).
75. Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464
(1979).
76. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
77. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (“[A]liens
receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the
United States and developed substantial connections with this country.”).
78. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
79. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).

ADEN.PRINTER.DOC

2002]

10/2/2002 2:30 PM

A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE PATRIOT ACT

1097

communication of ideas to discover and spread political and
80
economic truth.”
In addition, the Supreme Court has warned against the “chilling
effect” of government restrictions on speech, particularly core
political speech. The Court stated that “[t]he freedom of speech and
of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern
81
without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.”
A. Prosecution Under the Sedition Act of 1918
While First Amendment rights are significant, they are not absolute
and are subject to some limitations. These limitations are likely to be
recognized in cases of threats to national security generally, and in
the context of the “War on Terrorism” specifically.
Federal
prosecutors have acknowledged that they intend to prosecute certain
persons suspected of terrorist activities under the Sedition Act of
82
1918. That Act provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to
overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the
United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the
authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the
execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take,
or possess any property of the United States contrary to the
authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or
83
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

Courts generally have held the law to be constitutional on its face
84
as an appropriate exercise of authority to protect national security,
though historically it has been subject to abuse if applied broadly to
otherwise protected activities, such as the right to free speech. For
85
example, in Skeffington v. Katzeff, the Sedition Act was applied to
determine that the Communist Party had been organized for the
purpose of overthrowing the U.S. government, based in part on

80. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
81. Id. at 101-02.
82. Sedition Law Used to Hold Suspects, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 8, 2001, available at
http://www.infoshop.org/pipermail/infoshop-news/2001-November/000268.html.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (1994).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting
that the act was passed to help the government cope with urban terrorism and
therefore does not conflict with the treason clause of the Constitution which
provides a vehicle to make arrests before a conspiracy ripens into a violent situation).
85. 277 F. 129 (1st Cir. 1922).
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86

statements in the Communist Manifesto. Prosecutors have used such
material to prosecute individuals under the Sedition Act,
rendering it a particularly dangerous tool by which government
authorities may chill speech that they consider to be contrary to
87
government interests.
B. Exclusion of Non-Citizens Accused of “Endorsing” Terrorism
Parts of the Patriot Act explicitly allow determinations to be made
based on an individual’s beliefs or speech. Section 411 of the Patriot
88
Act amends the Immigration and Nationality Act to prohibit the
entry into the United States of any non-citizen who represents a
“foreign terrorist organization,” is a member of “a political, social, or
other similar group whose public endorsement of acts undermines
United States efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities,” or
89
supports or encourages others to support such organizations. In
addition, spouses and children of such non-citizens also are
90
prohibited from entry.
Attorney General Ashcroft justified this provision by explaining to
the Senate that the “ability of terrorists to move freely across borders
and operate within the United States is critical to their capacity to
91
inflict damage on the citizens and facilities in the United States.”
He then proposed to expand the grounds for removal of aliens for
92
terrorism to include material support to terrorist organizations.
The Patriot Act itself goes even further than the Attorney General’s
suggestions and threatens exclusion not only to those who provide

86. Id. at 132-33.
87. See, e.g., Wells v. United States, 257 F. 605 (9th Cir. 1919) (holding that a
resolution circulated by the defendant that organized workers should demand
exemption from military service for all conscientious objectors was admissible to
show seditious state of mind); Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 642 (7th Cir.
1947) (deciding that proof of conversations expressing pro-German sentiment,
though they had occurred long before the alleged acts of treason, were admissible to
prove motive and intent in trial for treason); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88,
123 (2d Cir. 1999) (allowing evidence that defendants had possession of Islamic
materials describing Jihad to be used to support a conviction for the World Trade
Center bombing); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 552 (2000) (prohibiting U.S. officers from assisting
in importation or distribution of books and articles containing illegal advocacy); 18
U.S.C. § 1717 (1994) (stating that printed matter containing material pertaining to
illegal activity is non-mailable and whoever attempts to mail it will be fined or
imprisoned).
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (2000).
89. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a), 115 Stat. 272, 346 (2001).
90. Id. (noting an exception to that provision for children and spouses who did
not know of the activity of the non-citizen or who have sufficiently renounced such
activity).
91. Homeland Defense Testimony, supra note 20.
92. Id. (noting that, under current law, the government can only remove aliens
if there is direct material support of an individual terrorist).
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93

“material support” to such organizations but also to those who
94
As of December 5, 2001, the State
provide “encouragement.”
Department, at the Attorney General’s request, had designated
95
thirty-nine groups as “terrorist organizations.” Under section 411,
any alien who is deemed to have made statements in support of, or
contributed funds to, such organizations, or associated with alleged
96
members thereof, is subject to deportation.
As in the case of
prosecutions for “sedition,” the United States has frequently
deported aliens upon suspicion that they support unpopular political
97
positions. The additional authority granted by the Patriot Act raises
the very real specter of “blacklisting” as an accepted immigration
98
policy, reminiscent of McCarthyism in the 1950s. This activity could
have a devastating effect on the First Amendment rights of Muslims
in the United States to practice their religion and support the Muslim
99
faith.
C. “Gagging” Businesses Subjected to Federal Searches
The Patriot Act also stifles the First Amendment rights of
businesses. Section 215 of the Act permits seizures from businesses,
100
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”),
of

93. See USA Patriot Act § 411, 115 Stat. at 347 (including in the definition of
“material support” such things as transportation, a safe house, and communications).
94. Id. at 346.
95. Homeland Defense Testimony, supra note 20; see also Designation of 39 “Terrorist
Organizations” Under the “PATRIOT USA Act,” 66 Fed. Reg. 63,620 (Dec. 7, 2001)
(classifying thirty-nine groups as “terrorist organizations” as of December 5, 2001).
96. USA Patriot Act § 411, 115 Stat. at 346-47.
97. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (upholding
deportation of alien for violation of the Alien Registration Act on sole grounds of
former membership in Communist Party); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954)
(upholding congressional power to deport alien who had lived in United States for
thirty years because he had briefly been a member of the Communist Party).
98. In what came to be known as the McCarthy era, the practice of blacklisting
organizations in a political witch hunt resulted in even marginalized groups being
listed by the Attorney General as “communist.” This practice was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (holding that the Attorney General did not have the
authority to arbitrarily blacklist the defendant groups).
99. The threat of exclusion is particularly real for the thousands of Muslim
residents who have contributed to, supported, or associated with the Holy Land
Foundation, which claims to be the largest Muslim charity in the United States. See
Mike Allen & Steven Mufson, U.S. Seizes Assets of 3 Islamic Groups: U.S. Charity Among
Institutions Accused Of Funding Hamas, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2001, at A1; Muslims Wary
of Making Donations: Ramadan a Time for Charity, But Many Fear Being Questioned by FBI,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 23, 2001 (reporting that, although the organization had been
the subject of FBI scrutiny for years, many individuals made contributions to it to
support its professed mission to aid Palestinian refugees), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId
=3859-2001Nov22&notFound=true.
100. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1829 (1994 & West
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records and other tangible items, including computer systems, upon
the Attorney General’s certification that the seizure is in furtherance
of “an investigation to protect against international terrorism or
101
The Patriot Act further
clandestine intelligence activities.”
prohibits persons from disclosing that they have any knowledge of
102
such seizures. In other words, the owners and officers of the
business are gagged from disclosing that they have been the subject
of an FBI search and seizure, presumably including disclosures to the
media. Moreover, the court issuing the subpoena is prohibited from
103
disclosing the purpose of the order.
D. The Attorney General’s View of Civil Libertarians Who Oppose Him
In his recent testimony before the Senate, the Attorney General
has demonstrated a willingness to reprimand civil libertarians who
have called into question the Bush Administration’s commitment to
104
civil rights in the wake of the terrorist attacks. Employing rhetoric
reminiscent of McCarthy-era labeling of critics as “un-American” and
“unpatriotic,” Ashcroft stated that critics have made “bold
declarations of so-called fact” that turned out to be vague
105
conjecture. He continued his counter-criticism by stating that:
Charges of “kangaroo courts” and “shredding the Constitution”
give new meaning to the term, “the fog of war.” We need honest,
reasoned debate; not fearmongering . . . . To those who scare
peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty; my message is
this: Your tactics only aid terrorists—for they erode our national
unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to
America’s enemies, and pause to America’s friends.
They
106
encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of evil.

Coupled with the Administration’s rather facile dismissal of
fundamental First Amendment freedoms, such as the rights to free
107
speech, free association without monitoring, and the freedom to

Supp. 2002); see discussion infra Part III.A (discussing the expansion of searches
permissible under FISA).
101. See USA Patriot Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 287 (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1863
(1998) by enacting a new section 501(a)(1)).
102. See id. (inserting new section 501(d)); see also Nat Hentoff, Who Knows?, LEGAL
TIMES, May 25, 2002 (discussing First Amendment implications of the
provision).
103. See USA Patriot Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 287 (inserting new section 501(c)(2)
that allows the judge to issue such secretive order if the judge finds that the FBI’s
application meets the requirements of the section).
104. Homeland Defense Testimony, supra note 20.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing the Patriot Act’s
negative treatment of people who associate with suspect groups).
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speak to the press about perceived abuses of the subpoena power,
the Attorney General’s statements demonstrate an extreme
insensitivity to the fundamental American right to dissent without
fear of retaliation.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FREEDOM FROM UNREASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The Patriot Act allows officials to sidestep the Fourth Amendment
by validating the wholesale disregard of the historic constitutional
protections of notice, probable cause, and proportionality. The Act
exemplifies what Justice William O. Douglas called “powerful
hydraulic pressures . . . that . . . water down constitutional
109
guarantees” and give the police more power than the magistrate.
The Fourth Amendment protects Americans from unreasonable
110
searches and seizures. The Supreme Court has frequently
expressed that the purpose of this Amendment is “to prevent
arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with
111
the privacy and personal security of individuals.”
The Court also
has noted that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to let a
“neutral and detached” judge decide when a search or seizure is
appropriate as opposed to a potentially biased “officer engaged in the
112
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”
The Court has noted that the amendment functions differently
113
from other constitutional protections in the criminal justice process
in that a violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs as soon as there

108. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining the “gag” order within
the Patriot Act).
109. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Specifically, the Amendment gives people the right
“to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Id.
111. The Court has varied the degree of protection that it will provide privacy
based on the context of a given situation. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (finding that the public interest in having vehicle checkpoints
at the Mexican border outweighs the slight privacy intrusion); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (holding that a minimal intrusion of a
random stop near the U.S. border is within the limits of the Fourth Amendment);
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) (deciding that at traffic checkpoints
not near the border, officers cannot search vehicles without probable cause). See
generally Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (explaining that the Fourth
Amendment provides rights that are “basic to a free society”).
112. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (emphasis added).
113. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (contrasting
the Fourth and the Fifth Amendment, the latter of which provides a right that can
only be violated at the time of trial).
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has been an unreasonable search or seizure, regardless of whether
114
the evidence is ever used in a criminal proceeding. However, since
the exclusion of evidence seized in a subsequent criminal proceeding
is the only remedy ordinarily available for such violations, the mass of
115
Fourth Amendment violations go undisclosed and unredressed.
In view of this, the Supreme Court has frequently decided that, in
order to prevent encroachment upon Fourth Amendment rights, the
116
Amendment should be given a liberal construction. Thus, while
proper criminal investigation requires that police have the authority
to investigate suspect activity thoroughly and disarm dangerous
117
citizens, the Court has always maintained that “[t]he scope of the
search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances
118
which rendered its initiation permissible.”
Indeed, courts will
scrutinize the manner in which the search or seizure was conducted
119
as much as they do its initial justification.


114. Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)); see also
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (explaining that once an unlawful
search or seizure has occurred, the use of the evidence from the search creates no
new Fourth Amendment violation).
115. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(noting that there is virtually no enforcement of the Fourth Amendment outside of
the court because the officers are the ones who are violating it). Specifically, Justice
Robert Jackson noted:
The right to be secure against searches and seizures is one of the most
difficult to protect. Since the officers are themselves the chief invaders, there
is no enforcement outside of court. . . . There may be, and I am convinced
that there are, many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles of
innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is
made, about which courts do nothing, and about which we never hear.
Id. In one example of such a case, the defendant was observed in a high crime area,
stopped, and patted down despite the fact that there was no reasonable suspicion
that he was armed or had engaged in criminal activity. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
48-49 (1979). Ordinarily, the individual would have gone on his way, intimidated
and humiliated, but unable to obtain redress because the actions of the officer were
not susceptible to proof that they were “shocking to the conscience” as amounting to
a “reckless disregard” for the subject’s personal liberty. See Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998). It was only because he was arrested and charged for
refusing to provide his name that his case came to light, a practice the Court held
violative of his right to decline to cooperate. Brown, 443 U.S. at 53.
116. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 303, 304 (1921) (recognizing the
encroachment of Fourth Amendment rights by both courts and police officers),
overruled on other grounds by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
117. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (disagreeing with the state that the issue
should be characterized in terms of the rights of police officers and seeking to
balance criminal justice aims with Fourth Amendment rights).
118. Id. at 19 (quoting Hayden, 387 U.S. at 310); see also United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 554
(1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
119. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28.
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A. Expansion of Searches Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
One of the most dramatic interferences with privacy under the
Fourth Amendment comes through the monitoring of
communications between individuals. Law enforcement authority to
conduct electronic surveillance and intelligence arises predominantly
120
from two federal statutes. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(“FISA”) allows wiretapping of citizens as well as resident aliens in the
121
United States upon a showing of probable cause that the target is a
122
“foreign power” or an “agent of a foreign power.” The FISA court
consists of eleven federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the
123
Supreme Court.
It hears surveillance requests on an expedited
124
basis.
125
Section 218 of the Patriot Act is, thus, critically significant.
It
amends FISA to provide that “foreign intelligence” need not be the
purpose of investigations seeking orders under the Act, but merely a
126
“significant purpose.”
The amendment applies both to FISA
electronic surveillance warrants and FISA warrants for physical
127
searches of property.
This greatly expands the power of federal
authorities to apply the relatively loose standards of FISA to
investigations of both U.S. citizens and residents that only
tangentially touch on national security.
The FISA court recently broke with its traditional secrecy to
publicly issue its May 17, 2002 Memorandum Opinion denying the
Justice Department the authority to broaden information sharing
128
with the Criminal Division of the Justice Department.
The FISA

120. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1829 (1994 & West
Supp. 2002); Wiretap Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
121. 50 U.S.C. § 1805. There is no statutory limit on wiretapping U.S. citizens or
resident aliens outsides the United States. However, per an Executive Order issued
by President Reagan in 1981, if a citizen or permanent legal resident is the target of
surveillance abroad, the Attorney General needs to approve it. Exec. Order No.
12,333,46, Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,951 (Dec. 4, 1981).
122. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3). The Act further clarifies that no such target will be
considered as such solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment.
Id.
123. Id. § 1803.
124. Id.
125. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001).
126. Id.
127. Section 218 of the Patriot Act amends 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B), which lists
requirements for a court order application for electronic surveillance, and 50 U.S.C.
§ 1823(a)(7)(B), which lists requirements for an order for a physical search, by
striking “the purpose” and inserting “a significant purpose.” In both sections, the
amended provision now reads, “Each application shall include . . . *** (7) a
certification . . . *** (B) [That] a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain
foreign intelligence . . . .”
128. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, No. 02-429,
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court refused to approve Justice’s proposed “minimization
procedures,” which govern the handling and reduction to usable
form of raw data obtained in foreign intelligence investigations, and
its proposed “wall” procedures, which establish standards for
ensuring that information obtained via FISA procedures is not
129
routinely shared with criminal prosecutors. The FISA court found
that the proposed revisions, which would have allowed sharing of raw
FISA data with criminal investigators and prosecutors, extensive
consultation with and reporting to prosecutors of FISA information
and coordination with prosecutors regarding FISA surveillance
gathering, amounted to giving criminal prosecutors “a significant
role directing FISA surveillances and searches from start to finish in
counterintelligence cases having overlapping intelligence and
criminal investigations or interests, guiding them to criminal
130
prosecution.”
The court suggested that the proposed procedures
were “designed to amend the law and substitute the FISA for Title III
electronic surveillances and [Fed. R. Crim. Proc.] Rule 41
131
searches,” and expressed its concern that Justice had adopted this
tactic “because the government is unable to meet the substantive
requirements of these law enforcement tools, or because their
132
administrative burdens are too onerous.” The FISA court noted but
declined to address the Attorney General’s overall position that the
Patriot Act amendments to FISA mean that FISA now can “be used
primarily for a law enforcement purpose, so long as a significant
133
The FISA appellate court,
foreign intelligence purpose remains.”
the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, met for
the first time in its history on September 9, 2002, to hear the Justice
134
Department’s request for a review of the FISA court’s decision. The
FISA review court’s decision is pending, but it is not known whether
the court will make its ruling public.

United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, __ F. Supp. 2d __, at 2002 WL
31017386 (May 17, 2002) [hereinafter Memorandum Op.]. See Dan Eggen & Susan
Schmidt, Secret Court Rebuffs Ashcroft: Justice Dept. Chided on Misinformation, WASH.
POST, Aug. 23, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 25998001; Ted Bridis, White House
Appeals Wiretap Ruling, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 23, 2002, available at http://abcnews.
go.com/wire/politics/ap20020823_273.html.
129. Memorandum Op., 2002 WL at *1 (requiring that the government’s
proposed changes be modified under FISA).
130. Id. at *11 (emphasis in original).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *3 n.2 (quoting Justice Dep’t briefing) (emphasis in original).
134. Senators Ask Secret Appellate Court to Release Decision, Spar over Justice FISA Request,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 10, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26545846.
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B. Sections 206 and 207: Roving FISA Wiretaps
The expansion of the definition of those subjected to surveillance
further undercuts Fourth Amendment privacy. Section 206 of the
Patriot Act amends FISA to allow the imposition of the FISA wiretap
warrant against unspecified persons, rather than specific
communications providers, thus allowing federal agents to apply FISA
wiretaps to any provider of communications services without
135
geographical limitation. The FISA court is required to find that the
actions of the target of the wiretap may thwart the identification of a
136
specified provider. Section 207 of the Patriot Act increases the time
period for FISA surveillance warrants (1) from 90 to 120 days for a
137
wiretap order, and (2) from 45 to 90 days for a physical search,
unless against an “agent of a foreign power,” in which case the
138
maximum is 120 days.
Attorney General Ashcroft justified this
“roving surveillance authority” by explaining that, because tracking
terrorist activity is so time sensitive, Americans could be harmed if law
enforcement had to take the time to get an additional court order
139
when tracking suspects into new jurisdictions.
This provision is problematic in that it distorts two extremely
important checks in the legal system that historically have provided a
measure of accountability for the validity of a warrant. First, the
amendment allows the issuance of so-called “blank warrants,” by
which the parties required to respond to the order need not be listed
140
on the face of the document.
This places such communications
providers in the position of having to accept the validity of the
warrant and its application to them virtually without question
(although the section does permit a provider to inquire with the
Attorney General as to who, through his various agents, obtained the
order in the first place, whether or not the order is valid). Second,
the order may not have been issued in the responding party’s
jurisdiction, creating hindrances of geography and expense for a
141
party that desires to challenge the order in court.

135. USA Patriot Act § 206 (amending § 105(c)(2)(B) of FISA).
136. Id.
137. Id. § 207(a)(1) (amending § 105(e)(1) of FISA).
138. Id. § 207(a)(2) (amending § 304(d)(1) of FISA).
139. Homeland Defense Testimony, supra note 20.
140. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of
warrant authority to include any person who might be helpful in the investigation
and not just the person who is specifically identified on the warrant application).
141. See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 208, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(amending 50 U.S.C. § 1803 to authorize courts in any jurisdiction to review such
motions or applications).
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C. Sections 214 and 216:
FISA Pen Register and “Trap and Trace” Orders
The capabilities of registering communications have created a
greater challenge to privacy protection. Section 214 expands the pen
register and trap and trace orders available under FISA to include any
investigations “to obtain foreign intelligence information not
concerning a United States person or to protect against international
142
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” A pen register is a
device that registers and records all telephone or Internet service
143
provider numbers dialed by a phone for outgoing communications.
A trap and trace device similarly registers numbers of telephones
144
FISA orders are not based on a probable cause or
dialing in.
145
reasonable suspicion requirement, but on “certification” that the
information sought is related to the professed law enforcement
146
purpose.
This is done on an ex parte basis, without notice to the
147
subject of the surveillance.
Section 216 expands the range of FISA pen register and trap and
148
Formerly, the
trace authority to “anywhere in the United States.”
order was limited to the jurisdiction of the court and to a particular
149
communications provider or location. Now, the order follows the
150
FBI and the suspect anywhere. Like the roving surveillance powers,
this raises concerns relating to identification of the party charged and
151
the practical ability to challenge the order.
These expanded powers to monitor telecommunications are
particularly prone to abuse in the Internet age, since pen register and
trap and trace orders now disclose not only standard telephone
numbers called by or dialing in to a subject, but also Internet URLs
152
and dedicated lines for data transmission. The ability to monitor

142. Id. § 214(a)(1) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1842 which did not previously include
investigations for “clandestine intelligence activities”).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(B)(3) (2000).
144. Id. § 3127(B)(4).
145. See United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR. 1023(LBS), 2001 WL 30061,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2000) (explaining that, under FISA, routine border searches
conducted at points of entry into the United States are not subject to a warrant,
probable cause, or reasonable suspicion requirement).
146. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2000).
147. Id. § 1842(d).
148. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 288-90 (2001).
149. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(d).
150. See USA Patriot Act § 216, 115 Stat. at 288-90 (authorizing the installation and
use of a pen register or trap and trace device anywhere within the United States
when it is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation).
151. See supra Part III.B (discussing roving surveillance powers).
152. See USA Patriot Act § 216, 115 Stat. at 290 (defining pen registers and trap
and trace devices to include a greater number of wire or electronic communication).
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Internet sites visited by the subject of a search, in the absence of a
153
showing of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, is an
unprecedented expansion of federal surveillance powers.
D. Section 215: Business Records Seizures Allowed Under FISA
Section 215 expands the business records seizures available under a
FISA order to allow law enforcement officials to obtain business
records and tangible things (e.g., computers and disks) upon a
154
similar ex parte rubber stamp order.
In addition, the Act states
that, “[n]o person shall disclose to any other person . . . that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained tangible
155
things under this section.” Therefore, the business is gagged from
disclosing that it has been the subject of an FBI search and seizure,
156
including to the media.
E. Sections 201 and 202: Expanding the Scope of the Wiretap Act
The second major federal surveillance statute, the Wiretap Act of
157
1968,
sometimes referred to as “Title III,” also has been
considerably expanded by the Patriot Act. The Wiretap Act imposes a
much higher hurdle even than is required (at least in theory) to
obtain a FISA order. It ordinarily requires a court order based upon
an affidavit establishing probable cause that a crime has been or is
about to be committed and that the search will turn up evidence
158
thereof. The Patriot Act, however, amends the Wiretap Act to allow
any investigative or law enforcement officer or government attorney
to obtain foreign intelligence information that relates to the ability of
159
the United States to protect against terrorism.
The protections afforded by the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968 were
160
intended to exceed those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
In order to receive constitutional protection for a communication
under the Fourth Amendment, a subject’s expectation of privacy
must be one that society is willing to recognize and one that the

153. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000).
154. USA Patriot Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 288.
155. Id.
156. See supra Part II.C (discussing the First Amendment rights of businesses).
157. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994).
158. Id. §§ 2516, 2518.
159. USA Patriot Act § 202, 115 Stat. at 280.
160. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1-2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555
(noting that the development of new methods of communication and surveillance
devices has dramatically expanded the Framers’ intended scope of the Fourth
Amendment).
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subject has taken reasonable precautions to protect. One year after
the Supreme Court’s seminal Fourth Amendment right of privacy
162
case, Katz v. United States,
Congress passed the Wiretap Act
specifically to address the electronic interception of oral
163
Nothing in the Act’s history, language, or
communications.
definitions requires that the subjects of a wiretap take precautions to
164
avoid being overheard or recorded. The Act presumes that the oral
communication on which the government is eavesdropping is
165
private. Further, the Supreme Court has declared that the Fourth
Amendment itself “does not permit the use of warrantless wiretaps
166
[even] in cases involving domestic threats to the national security.”
In spite of this purportedly high standard, wiretap orders are
virtually never denied. Between 1996 and 2000, of 6,207 reported
wiretap requests by federal and state agencies, only three were
167
denied, an approval rate of over 99.9%. Despite the apparent lack
of judicial checks on the availability of wiretap orders before the
passage of the Patriot Act, the Act expands their availability even
further. Sections 201 and 202 of the Patriot Act amend the Wiretap
Act to allow the FBI to obtain wiretap warrants for “terrorism”
investigations, “chemical weapons” investigations, or “computer fraud
168
and abuse” investigations.
This expands the federal government’s

161. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967); see also Bond v. United
States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
162. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
163. See Wiretap Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(a), (d), 82 Stat. 211, 211-12
(1969) (stating that wiretapping occurs frequently without the consent of the private
parties to be used as evidence and concluding that, in order to safeguard personal
privacy, interception should only be allowed when controlled or supervised by a
court); see also Wiretap Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 107, 100 Stat. 1858, 1858 (1989)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1991)) (providing that “nothing in this
Act or the amendments made by this act constitutes authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity.”).
164. Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (asserting that the Fourth
Amendment requires that expectation of privacy be both subjectively held and
objectively justified and that subjects take reasonable precautions to protect the
privacy of their communications).
165. See generally Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 514-20 (1985) (discussing the
lengthy history of federal wiretaps and adoption of the Wiretap Act).
166. Id. at 514-15 (citing United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972)). The Court stated that the decision “finally laid to rest the notion that
warrantless wiretapping is permissible in cases involving domestic threats to national
security.” Id. at 534.
167. STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1997 WIRETAP REPORT 33,
tbl. 7, Authorized Interceptions Granted Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2519 as Reported in Wiretap
Reports for Calendar Years 1990-2000 (2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
wiretap01/table701.pdf.
168. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-156, §§ 201-202, 115 Stat. 272, 278 (2001).
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000) (permitting interception and disclosure
of communications by a computer service provider to protect the service provider’s
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wiretap authority into the broad, as-yet-undefined area of “terrorism”
investigations and investigations related to computer use.
F.

Section 203b: Information Disclosed to CIA
and Other Intelligence Agencies

Section 203b of the Patriot Act employs the same expanded
definition of “foreign intelligence information” used in section 203a,
169
which permits grand jury information sharing, to allow sharing
between federal agencies of any information derived from wire, oral,
or electronic communications intercepted pursuant to the Wiretap
Act, where contents of such communications include “foreign
170
intelligence information.” The effect is to allow sharing of wiretap
information with any federal agency, including the CIA and INS,
whereas previously such sharing had to be related to the same
171
investigation that initially gave rise to the wiretap.
This new
provision is an important component of the Justice Department’s
desire to build a general federal database of all criminal
172
information.
G. Sections 209 and 210:
Voice Mail, Internet, and Telephone Monitoring
Section 209 amends the Wiretap Act to allow wiretaps of voice mail
173
messaging systems. Under prior law, stored voice mail messages fell
under the Title III category of “wire communications,” meaning that
messages stored by a service provider could only be seized pursuant
174
to the higher standards applicable to a wiretap order. This placed
voice mail in the same category as a real-time telephone or Internet
175
communication between two parties.

rights or property, including in cases of fraud).
169. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the end of the secrecy of grand juries).
170. USA Patriot Act § 203(b), 115 Stat. at 280.
171. See id. § 203(d), 115 Stat. at 281 (authorizing foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence to be disclosed to any federal law enforcement official to aid the
official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties).
172. See id. § 105, 115 Stat. at 277 (explaining that the Director of the United
States Secret Service shall take appropriate actions to develop a national network of
electronic crime task forces).
173. Id. § 209, 115 Stat. at 283.
174. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566
(observing that wire communications in storage like voice mail are protected); see
also United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
company voice mail message intercepted by unauthorized co-worker violated Wiretap
statute).
175. An “electronic communication service” is a service which provides its users
the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications, including
telephone companies and electronic mail companies. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 12
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The Patriot Act incorporates “wire communication” into the
176
definition of an “electronic communications system,” effectively
permitting access to such messages via a standard search warrant, as if
a voice mail message were merely a documentary record. However,
an individual’s constitutionally recognized expectation of privacy in
his or her message is not diminished by the fact that the message is
stored temporarily in a voice messaging system before being retrieved
177
by the recipient. Consequently, this provision of the Patriot Act is
178
constitutionally suspect under the Fourth Amendment.
Section 210 allows federal law enforcement officials to use an
“administrative subpoena” to obtain telephone or Internet/e-mail
service provider records of customer names, addresses, telephone
connection records, including time and duration, length of service,
and source of payment, including credit card or bank account
179
numbers. The amendment added time, duration, and source of
180
Now, federal authorities
payment to the information obtainable.
possess the power to access easily a suspect’s financial information
through his or her telephone number.
H. Section 213: “Sneak and Peek” Warrants
Notice of the execution of a warrant has long been held to be an
important component of the “reasonableness” of a search under the
181
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that a search or
seizure of a dwelling may be constitutionally defective if police
182
officers enter without prior announcement.
This requirement is
183
codified in the federal criminal procedure statutes, which allow the

(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3555, 3560.
176. USA Patriot Act § 204, 115 Stat. at 281.
177. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (explaining that “what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected . . . .”).
178. Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358-59 (concluding that surveillance of a telephone
booth should not be exempted from the usual requirement of advance authorization
by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause to keep individuals secure from
Fourth Amendment violations).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (1994).
180. USA Patriot Act § 204, 115 Stat. at 283.
181. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 932 n.2 (1995) (applying the common
law knock and announce principle to its Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry
and noting that this ancient standard dates back to the Magna Carta); Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 396 (1997) (holding that not even a felony drug search
creates an exception to the knock and announce requirement).
182. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936-37.
183. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1995) (providing that “[t]he officer may break open any
outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything
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subject of the warrant an opportunity to challenge the lawful
authority of the warrant or to prevent its defective execution, such as
when the wrong address is targeted or the subject no longer resides at
184
A legion of tragic incidents resulting from execution
the address.
of “no-knock” warrants demonstrate the potential dangers inherent
185
in serving such warrants on innocent victims.
In spite of the Supreme Court’s cautions and the statutory mandate
for the “knock and announce” protocol, section 213 of the Patriot Act
permits federal law enforcement officials to delay giving notice of the
execution of a search warrant to the subject of the warrant, even until
after it has been executed, if notification may have an adverse
186
result. Authority for the issuance of search warrants is derived from
two statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 3103, which implements the standards for
187
issuing warrants set out in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41

therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he
is refused admittance . . . .”).
184. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931-33 (discussing the important historical reasons for
the common law knock and announce principle, including allowing people to
comply with the law and avoid property destruction caused by forcible entry and to
prepare themselves by pulling on clothes or getting out of bed).
185. See, e.g., Atkins v. City of Dallas, Civil Action No: 3:95-CV-1424-D, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4983, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 1997) (describing a situation in which
officers executed “dynamic entry” with battering rams and flashbang devices, black
uniforms and masks, but suspect had vacated home one month earlier); Report on the
Death of Donald Scott (Office of the Dist. Attorney, Ventura, CA), Mar. 30, 1993, at 2
(documenting seizure and forfeiture operation targeting alleged marijuana growth
on economically desirable property, which resulted in shooting death of sixty-oneyear-old-owner and did not turn up any marijuana), at http://www.fear.org/
chron/scott.txt; Timothy Lynch, Another Drug War Casualty, CATO: TODAY’S
COMMENT (Cato Inst., Wash., D.C.), Nov. 30, 1998 (detailing death of Pedro Oregon
Navarro in raid on wrong address), at http://cato.org/dailys/11-30-98.html (on file
with the American University Law Review); Vicki Brown, Cops Kill Man, Raid Wrong
Home, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 6, 2000 (discussing raid of home next door to correct
address resulted in death of occupant), available at http://www.crimelynx.com/
kill.html; Daryl Farnsworth, Unity Plea in Slaying’s Wake Victim’s Kin, Friends Demonstrate
Across Town, Outside Gorbachev Speech, MODESTO BEE, Oct. 5, 2000, at B1 (stating that
eleven-year-old boy was killed in SWAT raid); Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179
(10th Cir. 2001) (execution of misdemeanor assault warrant involved seven SWAT
members in “ninja” style uniforms, “no-knock” entrance and children held at
gunpoint); Boston to Give Victim’s Widow $1 Million in Wrongful Death Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 1996, at A17 (documenting 1994 Boston incident in which police targeted
the wrong house and their raid on a seventy-five-year-old minister’s home resulted in
the man’s death from a heart attack).
186. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 213, 115 Stat. 272, 286 (2001).
187. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. Rule 41 permits the issuance of a warrant,
[T]o search for and seize any (1) property that constitutes evidence of the
commission of a criminal offense; or (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or
things otherwise criminally possessed; or (3) property designed or intended
for use or which is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal
offense; or (4) person for whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is
unlawfully restrained.
Id.
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and 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, a “catchall” provision that provides additional
grounds for the issuance of a warrant “to search for and seize any
property that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of
188
Section 213 amends the latter
the laws of the United States.”
“catchall” provision, adding a new subsection (b), which provides that
the requisite notice of the issuance of any warrant (under any
provision of law) may be delayed if the court has reasonable cause to
believe that the immediate notification of execution of the warrant
189
will have an adverse effect.
The warrant need only provide for
giving notice “within a reasonable period of its execution,” and the
190
period may be extended for “good cause.”
Furthermore, while section 213 stipulates that warrants issued
under the delayed notice provision prohibit the seizure of tangible
property, communications, or electronic data, such as computer
equipment, mail, or voice mail, this requirement may be waived if the
191
court finds “reasonable necessity for the seizure.” Consequently, a
person whose home has been the subject of a search and whose
computer equipment, mail, and other sensitive items have been
seized may find out about it through a letter in the mail weeks or
192
months later.
Moreover, the definition of “adverse result” is borrowed from
another provision of the code that permits relaxed notification
requirements in the context of a court order or subpoena for stored
e-mail or voice mail data, not the search of a residence, which has always
been held to the highest standard of protection under the Fourth
193
Amendment. That provision includes the following as “adverse

188. 18 U.S.C. § 3103(a) (1995).
189. See USA Patriot Act § 213, 115 Stat. at 285-86 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3103a to
create new § 3103a (b)(1)).
190. See USA Patriot Act § 213, 115 Stat. at 286 (adding new 18 U.S.C.
§ 3103a(b)(3)).
191. See id. (adding new 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2)).
192. Arguably, this kind of “notice” is not notice at all, since the owner did not
have warning of forthcoming infringement in advance. Where the execution of a
warrant left behind clear evidence that the property had been searched or seized,
“notice” by way of a later admission that it was law enforcement authorities, not
burglars, who were on the premises seems to make a mockery of the constitutional
rationale for notice. To paraphrase an ancient maxim of justice, “[n]otice delayed is
notice denied.”
193. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 596-97 (1980) (noting that under
common law, “the freedom of one’s house” was one of the most vital elements of
English liberty); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) (explaining that
private homes have enjoyed a virtually sacrosanct position in English and American
law and concluding that the practice of media “ride-alongs” to film the execution of
warrants at residences violates the Fourth Amendment). The Court also quoted an
early English case which stated that “the house of every one is to him as his castle and
fortress, as well for his defense against injury and violence, as for his repose.” Id.
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results” justifying delayed notice:
(A) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual;
(B) flight from prosecution;
(C) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
(D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly
194
delaying a trial.

The phrase “otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation”
injects an inherently subjective criterion into the standard,
permitting law enforcement authorities and courts broad authority to
195
expand the number of cases involving delayed notice.
IV. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO INDICTMENT BY A GRAND JURY
The new anti-terrorism legislation and regulations are problematic
for the Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment. The Fifth
Amendment provides citizens the right to indictment by jury for
capital or other infamous crimes, “except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
196
or public danger . . . .”
A. Ending the Historic Secrecy of Grand Juries
Section 203(a) of the Patriot Act amends Rule 6 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to grand jury indictments and
197
vitiates the historic secrecy of grand juries. The transcripts and
documents obtained by the grand jury process were heretofore
secret, allowing only for disclosure upon court order showing
198
substantial need or challenge by defendants to the indictment. The
reason for this protection derived from the formidable power of the
199
grand jury. Because the function of the grand jury is inquisitorial,

(citing Semayne’s case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604)).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (1995).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Heatly, No. S11 96 CR. 515 (SS), 1998 WL 691201,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998) (discussing the conditions justifying delayed notice of
a search order).
196. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
197. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203(a), 115 Stat. 272, 278-81 (2001);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.
198. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§§ 8.6-8.7 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the grand jury’s investigative authority and
Fourth Amendment challenges to subpoenas).
199. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). The Court stated that the
grand jury,
is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the
scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of
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alone among American criminal justice authorities in this respect, it
is afforded broad-ranging authority to secure documents and witness
testimony through subpoena power, and the secrecy of its
proceedings and the information obtained thereby have historically
200
been sacrosanct. A recent example of this power is seen in the
Monica Lewinsky investigation when the jury sitting under Judge
Norma Hollowell Johnson subpoenaed numerous White House
201
officials to testify.
The Patriot Act may potentially distort the grand jury’s function of
maintaining secrecy. The Supreme Court has noted that two
objectives of grand jury secrecy have particular application to the
internal secrecy of subpoenaed documents and testimony. These
include the grand jury’s goals (1) “to encourage free and
untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with
respect to the commission of crimes” and (2) “to protect [the]
innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that
202
he has been under investigation . . . .” The Patriot Act may likely
have the effect of discouraging free disclosure because witnesses will
know their information may be shared with a wide range of law
enforcement authorities. Also, the “innocent accused” will find his
private records disseminated widely among federal law enforcement
agencies and perhaps placed in a central databank of suspect
information, despite his formal exoneration, a phenomenon that flies
in the face of the maxim “innocent until proven guilty.”
Abandoning traditional safeguards on the power of grand juries,
new Federal Rule 6(e)(3)(c)(I)(V) allows disclosure of foreign
intelligence,
counterintelligence,
or
“foreign
intelligence
information” to an array of federal officials “in order to assist the

propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts
whether any particular individual will be found subject to an accusation of
crime.
Id.
200. See id. (discussing the investigatory and inquisitory powers of the grand jury
under the Fifth Amendment and related statutes); see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra
note 198, § 8.2(c) (discussing the history of grand juries).
201. E.g., Andrew Miga, Court Demands to See Clinton Lawyer, BOSTON HERALD, Aug.
5, 1998, at 4 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to make Lanny Breuer, a
member of the White House Counsel’s Office, testify before the grand jury).
202. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 n.6, 684 (1958).
After a criminal investigation against Proctor & Gamble for Sherman Act violations,
the grand jury chose not to bring an indictment. Id. at 679. However, the
Department of Justice brought a subsequent civil suit against Proctor & Gamble and,
despite the absence of an indictment, used the grand jury transcripts in that suit. Id.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of Proctor & Gamble’s
discovery request for the transcript, finding no “compelling necessity” to set aside the
“indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings.” Id. at 682 (quoting United States
v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943)).
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official receiving that information in the performance of his official
203
duties.” “Foreign intelligence information” is, in turn, defined
broadly to include:
(A) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that
relates to the ability of the United States to protect against
(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power;
(ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; or
(iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or
network of a foreign power or by an agent of foreign power; or
(B) information, whether or not concerning a United States
person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that
relates to
(i) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
204
(ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.

The non-restriction to “United States persons” means that
information relating to any person, citizen, non-citizen, or alien, can
be the subject of grand jury information sharing.
B. Elimination of the Right to Indictment by Grand Jury
for Non-Citizens Accused of “Terrorism”
The constitutional right to indictment by a grand jury for any
infamous crime has come under fire in the “War on Terrorism.” It
would be entirely obviated by the application of President Bush’s
Executive Order establishing military tribunals to accused alien
205
residents, as well as accused citizens.
V. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Many of the new regulations have undercut the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel by inhibiting both the ability to obtain counsel and
the privacy that is afforded through the attorney-client relationship.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees citizens accused in criminal
206
proceedings “the assistance of counsel” for their defense.


203. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203a, 115 Stat. 272, 280 (2001).
204. Id. § 203a, 115 Stat. at 281 (emphasis added).
205. See generally Part IV (discussing the constitutionality of the order and its
application to resident citizens).
206. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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A. Monitoring Attorney-Client Conversations
For the first time in modern history, federal authorities may now
refuse to respect the age-old, virtually absolute confidentiality
207
On
enjoyed by a prisoner consulting with his or her attorney.
October 30, 2001, the Justice Department unilaterally imposed a
requirement on federal correctional facilities that would allow the
correspondence and private conversations between prisoners and
208
their counsel to be subjected to monitoring in most situations. This
rule was put into effect immediately by Attorney General Ashcroft,
without the usual protections of notice and public comment afforded
209
by the federal Administrative Procedures Act. The rule was posted
in the Federal Register on October 31, 2001, the day after it went into
effect. Further, the rule is not limited to alleged terrorists; rather, it
210
extends to all incarcerated individuals.
Under the rule,
communications or mail between prisoners and their attorneys may
be monitored if the Attorney General “has certified that reasonable
suspicion exists to believe that an inmate may use communications
with attorneys or their agents to further or facilitate acts of violence
211
or terrorism.”
Because the phrase “acts of violence” is so broad and discretion is
vested in the Attorney General to certify which prisoners are subject
to the rule, no protections exist to ensure that the monitoring will
not rapidly expand to include a large percentage of federal
212
As the American Bar Association has noted, this
prisoners.

207. Courts have held that a solid attorney-client relationship necessarily allows for
open communication. See United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 1978)
(stating that “free two-way communication between client and attorney is essential if
the professional assistance guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is to be
meaningful”); see also Flaherty v. Warden of Conn. State Prison, 229 A.2d 362 (Conn.
1967) (holding that the right to counsel includes the right to consult in private).
208. National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism; Final Rule,
66 Fed. Reg. 55,061, 55,063 (Oct. 31, 2001) [hereinafter National Security]
(amending C.F.R. pts. 500 & 501); see also George Lardner, Jr., U.S. Will Monitor Calls
to Lawyers: Rule on Detainees Called ‘Terrifying,’ WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2001, at A1.
209. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966) (requiring posting of proposed federal agency
rules in the Federal Register with an invitation for public comment and providing
that the rule be published at least thirty days before it becomes effective unless the
agency can show “good cause”).
210. See National Security, supra note 208, at 55,065 (defining “inmate” to include
“all persons” in federal custody).
211. Id. at 55,062.
212. The Attorney General claims that “[w]e have the authority to monitor the
conversations of 16 of the 158,000 federal inmates and their attorneys because we
suspect that these communications are facilitating acts of terrorism. . . . Information
will only be used to stop impending terrorist acts and save American lives.” DOJ
Oversight Testimony, supra note 21. If that is so, why did the Justice Department claim
the need for such broad language, which does not restrict monitoring to suspected
“terrorists?”
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monitoring violates the attorney-client privilege and is a serious
213
infringement upon a suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Prior to the issuance of this regulation, a judicial order could permit
monitoring of attorney-client communications only upon a showing
that the government had probable cause to believe that criminal
214
activity was occurring.
The monitoring places an attorney in the
position of either violating the ethical obligation to maintain
confidentiality of communications with the client or foregoing such
communications altogether, thereby seriously jeopardizing the ability
215
to obtain or sustain legal representation.
B. Refusing Suspects Access to Counsel and
Discouraging Detainees from Obtaining Legal Counsel
The Justice Department has detained over 1,000 people in its
216
investigation into the September 11th attacks. Reportedly, some of
these detainees have been discouraged from obtaining legal counsel
217
or have had access to counsel blocked outright. For example, San
Antonio physician Albador Al-Hazmi was held incommunicado for
days as a material witness, despite his lawyer’s efforts to gain access to
218
him.
Historically, courts have placed great importance on proper
attorney-client relations in determining the legitimacy of things like
219
evidence and confessions. The tactics in the Patriot Act which
sidestep this principle are a clear violation of the Sixth Amendment.


213. ABA Leadership Statement of Robert E. Hirshorn, President (Nov. 9, 2001)
[hereinafter Hirshorn], at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/justice_department.
html (on file with the American University Law Review); see, e.g., Black v. United
States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966) (determining that admission that the FBI had monitored
conversations between accused and counsel necessitated vacating the conviction for
tax evasion).
214. Hirshorn, supra note 213.
215. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1986); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1992).
216. Lardner, supra note 208, at A1.
217. Lois Romano & David S. Fallis, Questions Swirl Around Men Held in Terror Probe,
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2001, at A1.
218. Peter Slevin & Mary Beth Sheridan, Justice Dept. Uses Arrest Powers Fully: Scope
of Jailings Stirs Questions on Detainees’ Rights to Representation and Bail, WASH. POST, Sept.
26, 2001, at A10.
219. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (holding statement inadmissible
where counsel and accused were prohibited from consulting); see, e.g., People v.
Failla, 199 N.E.2d 366 (N.Y. 1964) (holding confession involuntary where counsel
was denied access to client).
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VI. MILITARY TRIBUNALS:
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
President Bush’s proposal to try suspected terrorists in military
tribunals undermines the constitutional guarantee of the right to trial
by jury. The Sixth Amendment provides the accused in a criminal
prosecution with the right to receive “a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
220
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an Executive Order
suspending the rights of indictment, trial by jury, appellate relief, and
habeas corpus for all non-citizen persons accused of aiding or
221
abetting terrorists. The Order, issued pursuant to the President’s
authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, stated that
the terrorist attacks had created an armed conflict necessitating the
use of the military. The President declared that, in order to “protect
the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct of
military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary
for individuals subject to this Order . . . to be detained, and, when
tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable
222
laws” in military tribunals. The Order allows the President to
subject non-U.S. citizens to this order if he determines and states in
writing that there is reason to believe that the individual (1) is or was
a member of al Qaida, (2) has “engaged in, aided or abetted, or
conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in
preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as
their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States,
its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy,” or (3) has
harbored any of the aforementioned individuals knowingly and that
the best interest of the United States is served by applying the Order
223
to such a person.
The Order directs the Secretary of Defense to promulgate orders
and regulations for the appointment and administration of the
224
military commissions that will try suspected terrorists. However, the

220. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
221. Military Order of Nov. 11, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terror, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 57,834.
224. Id.
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Order declares that, because of the dangerous nature of international
terrorism, these commissions will not “apply the principles of law or
225
the rules of evidence that are used in normal criminal cases.” The
regulations only permit admission of evidence that the Secretary
226
deems not to violate national security. Therefore, the military will
sit as both the adjudicator of fact and arbiter of law. In addition,
227
these tribunals may impose the death penalty, even though only a
two-third majority vote, instead of the unanimity mandated in civilian
228
trials, is required for a sentence.
Suspects tried under this Order will be under the exclusive
229
They will not be afforded
jurisdiction of the military tribunals.
habeas corpus relief nor will they be permitted to appeal to any court,
230
either within the United States or internationally.
Only the
Secretary of Defense will be able to review final decisions of the
231
military commissions.
While the Bush Administration’s draft procedures for these
military tribunals reportedly address some of the concerns raised by
civil libertarians, including allowing for unanimous verdicts in death
232
penalty cases and opening trials to the public, the final regulations
have not yet been adopted. Until they are finalized, the language of
the Executive Order controls the interpretation of the procedures to
be followed. Further, certain reported provisions of the draft
procedures that run counter to the Executive Order, such as the
requirement for unanimity in death penalty cases, may require an
amendment to the Order itself, which might be difficult to obtain.
Moreover, while the reported draft procedures would permit review
of tribunal decisions by “an appeals body,” that body, according to
the reports, would not be a court of law, but perhaps a separate
233
military review panel.
The U.S. Constitution provides that all crimes except for
impeachment shall be tried by a jury in the state where the crimes

225. Id. at 57,833.
226. Id. at 57,835.
227. Id. at 57,834.
228. Id. at 57,835.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 57,836.
231. Id.
232. Charles Cane, Terrorism Tribunal Rights are Expanded: Draft Specifies Appeals,
Unanimity on Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2001, at A1; John Mintz, U.S. Adds
Legal Rights in Tribunals, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at A1; Ctr. For Democracy &
Tech., Implementation of Other Anti-Terrorism Measures (tracking changes in military
tribunal regulations since Sept. 11, 2001), at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot
/implementation.shtml (last visited Sept. 4, 2002).
233. Id.
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have been committed or, when the crime is not committed within any
234
state, in a place that is selected by Congress.
The military tribunal Order, by abolishing the right to trial by jury
and reserving the power to the Executive Branch to determine when,
where, and under what conditions such tribunals will be conducted,
represents arguably the most drastic curtailment of the Sixth
Amendment rights of the criminally accused since the Second World
War.
Courts have held that the authority vested in Congress “[t]o make
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces”
235
does not grant it the power to try civilians in military tribunals.
Thus, the Executive Branch has sought to create the military
tribunals itself. The chief authority upon which the Department of
Justice relies for the Executive Branch’s purported authority to
impose trial by military tribunal is the World War II-era Supreme
236
Court case of Ex parte Quirin, a case meriting extensive review given
the framework it has laid for assessing the post-September 11th
tribunals. In a special session called by Chief Justice Harlan Stone,
the Supreme Court considered the habeas corpus petitions of eight
German citizens who had landed by submarine on East Coast ports in
New York and Florida, with orders to destroy American military
237
They were wearing German military
manufacturing plants.
uniforms or military items when they landed and were under the pay
238
and orders of the German High Command. The FBI arrested the
239
men in Chicago and New York.
By order as Commander in Chief on July 2, 1942, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed a military commission and
directed it to try the subjects for offenses against the law of war and
240
the Articles of War.
On the same day, the President further

234. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1957) (holding
that American civilians accused of murdering U.S. soldiers abroad could not be tried
in military courts).
235. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23
(1955) (concluding that a civilian could not be retried by the military for crimes
allegedly committed while serving in the armed forces).
236. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
237. Id. at 21.
238. Id. at 21-22.
239. Id. at 22.
240. Id. The opinion in Ex parte Quirin explains the statutory support for the
president’s call for military tribunals. The Court states:
By the Articles of War, 10 U. S. C. § 1471-1593, Congress has provided rules
for the government of the Army. It has provided for the trial and
punishment, by court martial, of violations of the Articles by members of the
armed forces and by specified classes of persons associated or serving with
the Army. Arts. 1, 2. But the Articles also recognize the “military
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proclaimed that:
all persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at
war with the United States or who give obedience to or act under the
direction of any such nation, and who during time of war enter or
attempt to enter the United States . . . through coastal or boundary
defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or
preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or
violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to
241
the jurisdiction of military tribunals . . . .

Since Roosevelt was held to be acting within his executive power
pursuant to Congress’ declaration of war under Article 15 of the
Articles of War, the Court did not determine “to what extent the
President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create
military commissions without the support of Congressional
242
legislation.”
Thus, the case does not directly address the precise
issue that arises under the current Executive Order, leaving open the
question of the legitimacy of the currently proposed military tribunals
in a time of undeclared war.
The Court in Ex parte Quirin did battle with the general issue of the
president’s authority to create military tribunals. The petitioners’
main contention was that the President lacked constitutional or
statutory authority to order a military tribunal and that they were
entitled to be tried in civilian courts and afforded the protections of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. In its analysis, the Court first
243
reviewed the Civil War case of Ex parte Milligan, which arose out of
President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil
War. Milligan, a civilian resident of the Union state of Indiana, was
tried and convicted by a military tribunal for seditious assistance to

commission” appointed by military command as an appropriate tribunal for
the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of war not ordinarily
tried by court martial. See Arts. 12, 15. Articles 38 and 46 authorize the
President, with certain limitations, to prescribe the procedure for military
commissions. Articles 81 and 82 authorize trial, either by court martial or
military commission, of those charged with relieving, harboring or
corresponding with the enemy and those charged with spying . . . .
But . . . [the Articles do] not exclude from that class “any other person who
by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals” and who under
Article 12 may be tried by court martial or under Article 15 by military
commission.
Id. at 26-27.
241. Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942) (emphasis added).
The Proclamation was extended to permit trial by military tribunal of U.S. citizens or
resident aliens found to have engaged in acts of war. Id. However, the Court did not
address this provision or comment upon potential application of the President’s
order beyond foreign nationals. Id.
242. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.
243. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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244

the Confederacy and sought habeas relief after receiving his
245
The Supreme Court emphasized the
sentence of hanging.
importance of the issue of Milligan’s right to habeas relief, declaring
that it “involves the very framework of the government and the
246
fundamental principles of American liberty.”
Despite the issuance
of the presidential proclamation, which suspended the writ under
247
certain circumstances,
the Court obtained jurisdiction by
congressional authorization to review denial of the writ to civilian
248
citizens of Northern states.
In Milligan, Justice David Davis wrote about the pressing concern
before the Court, observing that, “[i]t is the birthright of every
American citizen when charged with crime, to be tried and punished
according to law . . . . By the protection of the law human rights are
secured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of
249
wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people.” He noted that,
unless law justified military trial, the Court had the duty to nullify the
acts of the military. He stressed that a decision regarding the
existence of justifiable law was not to be made based on precedent
and argument, but rather was to be determined by the Constitution
250
The Court clarified that, if the
and the laws authorized by it.

244. Id. at 108.
245. Id. at 107-08. Milligan also had been the subject of a civilian grand jury
investigation, which was discharged without returning an indictment. Id.
246. Id. at 109. Justice Davis’ explanation pertaining to the importance of habeas
rings cautionary for our own times. He suggested that the concern for safety and the
preoccupation with power struggles during times of political and social unrest
dominate the rational decision-making process and that it is only in times of security
that the rational mind necessary for sound legal judgment can operate. Id.; see also
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1963) (noting the importance of the writ of
habeas corpus in the growth of personal liberty and its function to secure a prompt
remedy for “intolerable restraints”). The Court stated that “in a civilized society,
government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment:
if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with fundamental requirements of
law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release.” Id. at 399-400 (quoting Ex
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807)).
247. See Proclamation No. 7, reprinted in 13 Stat. 734 (1963). President Lincoln
suspended the writ in cases in which officers of the United States:
h[e]ld persons in their custody either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders and
abettors of the enemy, . . . or belonging to the land or naval forces of the
United States, or otherwise amenable to military law, or the rules and articles
of war, or the rules or regulations prescribed for the military or naval
services, by authority of the President, or for resisting a draft, or for any
other offence against the military or naval service.
Id.; see also 12 Stat. 755 (limiting the authority of such proclamations in cases where
citizens of Northern states had been the subject of “no bill” grand jury proceedings
in the district courts).
248. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 115-16.
249. Id. at 119.
250. Id. Justice Davis further expanded on the role of precedent by stating that
these precedents inform the Court of the “struggle to preserve liberty and to relieve
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protections of due process, grand jury indictment, trial by jury, and
habeas corpus were available to Milligan, they unquestionably
251
controlled the case.
The Court determined that the military tribunal did not have the
authority to try Milligan because Congress’s constitutional Article III,
section 1 authority was not broad enough to grant it, and the
President’s power, under the separation of powers doctrine, allowed
252
The Court
him only the right to execute laws, not make them.
further explained that, because federal courts of Indiana were trying
cases during the Civil War, and the acts alleged were the subject of
congressionally prescribed criminal penalties, the government had
no reason to assume that a federal court would not sentence Milligan,
253
if guilty, to an appropriate punishment.
Even if an unrestrained
Milligan presented danger because he “conspired against the
government, afforded aid and comfort to rebels, and incited the
254
people to insurrection,” the court was not without remedy. Legally,
he could have been arrested and confined so that he could not cause
further harm, after which his case would have gone to the grand jury
255
and possibly to trial.

those in civil life from military trials. The founders of our government were familiar
with the history of that struggle; and secured in a written constitution every right
which the people had wrested from power during a contest of ages.” Id.
251. Id. at 120-21. Once again, the Court’s words ring true for our age, as it
discussed the foresight of the Framers in creating irrepealable law to withstand
detrimental efforts to undermine constitutional liberty. The Court stated:
The history of the world had taught them that what was done in the past
might be attempted in the future. The Constitution of the United States is a
law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was
ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a
doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity
on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has
all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as
has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just
authority.
Id. (emphasis added).
252. Id. at 121.
253. Id. at 122.
254. Id.
255. Id. Even in times of war, the regular criminal justice system offers some
remedies without resort to military tribunals. See Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S.
631 (1947) (upholding the indictment and conviction of a World War II civilian
conspirator for treason for knowingly aiding a would-be saboteur). Furthermore, in
the post-September 11th era, the DOJ has already relied on the normal channels of
established criminal law and procedure to try alleged terrorists, such as when it used
a conspiracy indictment of an alleged insider of the attacks, Zacarias Moussaoui, a
legal resident French Moroccan. Man Indicted in Attacks Conspiracy, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 11, 2001, available at http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/2001-12-
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The Court further held that Milligan’s constitutional right to trial
by jury had been violated. This right, which is cherished in a free
country, is granted to everyone accused of a crime who is not actually
256
serving in the military or a part of the army or navy. The Framers
intended the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in criminal cases
to be enjoyed by all persons who were included in the right to
257
indictment or presentment by grand jury via the Fifth Amendment.
Martial law could not be imposed, the Court warned, absent an
“actual and present” necessity arising from a real invasion, “such as
258
effectively closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.”
The Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin construed Ex parte Milligan
not to reach the issue of military tribunals established to try violations
259
of the “law of war.” Furthermore, Congress had not delineated by
260
The
statute the particular offenses within the scope of that term.
Court noted that the law of war, created by universal agreements and
practice, “draws a distinction between the armed forces and the
peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those
261
who are lawful and unlawful combatants.” The Court stated that
spies and saboteurs are examples of such “unlawful combatants” who
262
The
are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.
Quirin Court restricted Milligan to its factual predicate and concluded

11/usw_indictment.asp.
256. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 123.
257. Id. (clarifying that this excludes only “cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or public danger”).
258. Id. at 127. It is fitting to leave Milligan with another caution of Justice Davis:
It is essential to the safety of every government that, in a great crisis, like the
one we have just passed through, there should be a power somewhere of
suspending the writ of habeas corpus. In every war, there are men of
previously good character, wicked enough to counsel their fellow-citizens to
resist the measures deemed necessary by a good government to sustain its
just authority and overthrow its enemies; and their influence may lead to
dangerous combinations. . . . The illustrious men who framed [the
Constitution] were guarding the foundations of civil liberty against the
abuses of unlimited power; they were full of wisdom, and the lessons of
history informed them that a trial by an established court, assisted by an
impartial jury, was the only sure way of protecting the citizen against
oppression and wrong. Knowing this, they limited the suspension to one
great right, and left the rest to remain forever inviolable. But, it is insisted
that the safety of the country in time of war demands that this broad claim
for martial law shall be sustained. If this were true, it could be well said that a
country, preserved at the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is
not worth the cost of preservation. Happily, it is not so.
Id. at 125-26.
259. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 30-31.
262. Id.
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263

that the law of war does not apply to non-military citizens.
It is important to note, moreover, that the Court’s approval in Ex
parte Quirin of this exercise of the Articles of War appears to have
been predicated, at least in part, upon the formal declaration of war
by President Roosevelt on the Axis powers, making it distinguishable
from the situation that existed in Milligan. The Court defined the
action, following the President’s proclamation triggering the law of
war, as an exercise of the congressional authority “to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within
constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to
try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of
the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are
264
cognizable by such tribunals.”
The application of Milligan and Quirin to President Bush’s
Executive Order is evident. Congress has not restricted the writ of
habeas corpus for persons suspected of engaging in or abetting the
terrorist attacks, as it arguably has limited authority to do under
265
Article III, section 1 of the Constitution.
The Article III power to
“ordain and establish” inferior courts has generally been held to
grant Congress the authority to circumscribe the jurisdictional limits
266
of inferior federal courts. The broad reach of the Executive Order,
ostensibly drawing in all persons who are non-citizens and whom the
President determines have aided or abetted terrorist acts, includes
267
resident legal and undocumented aliens. The Supreme Court has
found that such persons are entitled to all of the protections afforded
to “persons” via the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, including the right
to indictment by a grand jury, the right to trial by jury, the right to
268
counsel, and the right to confront witnesses. Although the writ of

263. See id. at 45 (concluding that, since Milligan was not a member of or tied to
the enemy’s armed forces and was not a belligerent, Milligan was not subject to the
law of the war).
264. Id. at 28.
265. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“[T]he judicial power of the United States, shall
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”).
266. Id.; see, e.g., Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000) (affirming authority of
Congress via the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act to impose statutory
restrictions on length of time to bring habeas petition).
267. As to citizens, the availability of due process and civilian trials has been
repeatedly confirmed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327
U.S. 304 (1946) (holding that a civilian could not be tried in military tribunal for
assaulting Marine officers). This applies to citizens of ancestry from enemy nations.
E.g., Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) (holding that the War
Relocation Authority could not subject an American citizen of Japanese ancestry to
detention who was concededly loyal).
268. See generally Duncan, 327 U.S. at 304; Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. at 283
(discussing problems associated with disregarding the constitutional rights of
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habeas corpus is often referred to as a “privilege,” its availability is a
matter of constitutional import, as Article I of the Constitution
provides that “[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public
269
safety may require it.” The Milligan Court appears to have implicitly
considered the Civil War one such appropriate case. It is doubtful,
however, that the attacks of September 11th and the prospect of
further terrorism could be construed to amount to cases of rebellion
or invasion requiring suspension of the writ. Consequently, any
enforcement of the Executive Order to impose trial by military
tribunal on any person other than a non-United States national
outside the borders of the country will not pass constitutional muster.
VII. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Certain anti-terrorism proposals jeopardize the individual right to
receive due process. The Fifth Amendment states that, “[n]o person
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
270
of law.”
A. Section 412:
Indefinite Detention of Non-Citizens Without Due Process
The Patriot Act creates challenges to protected Fifth Amendment
liberty. Section 412 of the Act requires the Attorney General to take
into custody any alien whom he certifies is subject to the preceding
section 411, or, in other words, any alien that he has “reasonable
grounds to believe” is “engaged in any other activity that endangers
271
the national security of the United States.” He may hold the alien
for seven days, at which point he must either charge him criminally
272
or initiate the process of deportation. Habeas corpus review is the
273
While a habeas
only court review available to such a detainee.
petition may be initiated in the Supreme Court, to any justice of the

resident non-citizens). The lack of due process to be afforded to those charged in
military tribunals may be compounded by difficulty in obtaining counsel to represent
them, since the rules of such tribunals may not permit attorneys to provide
“competent representation” in accordance with their ethical obligations. See Stephen
Gillers, No Lawyer to Call, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at A19 (arguing that rules of
professional responsibility preclude attorneys from providing competent counsel of
accused in military tribunals).
269. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 2.
270. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
271. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350 (2001).
272. Id. § 412, 115 Stat. at 351.
273. See id. (providing that judicial review of any action or decision relating to
mandatory detention of suspected terrorists is available exclusively in habeas corpus
proceedings).
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Supreme Court, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, or any
district court, only the D.C. Court of Appeals may review an appeal
274
from a circuit or federal district court judge.
If an immigrant is detained for purposes related to immigration
under this provision, there is no statutory or constitutional authority
275
to control the length of the detention. This has frequently resulted
in the indefinite detention of non-resident foreigners in U.S.
276
detention facilities, and oftentimes prisons, with no remedy.
B. Section 106: Seizure of Assets Without Due Process
The Patriot Act also invokes the issue of property protection under
the Fifth Amendment. Title I, section 106 of the Patriot Act greatly
increases presidential authority over the property or assets of foreign
persons or organizations by amending section 203 of the
277
International Emergency Powers Act. The section grants the Chief
Executive broad new powers in the time of armed hostilities or attack
by foreign actors to “confiscate any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign
organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned,
authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the
278
United States.” The section further allows the President to direct

274. Id. § 412, 115 Stat. at 352.
275. See id. § 412, 115 Stat. at 351 (allowing an alien to be detained for additional
periods of up to six months if the release of the alien will threaten the national
security of the United States).
276. Unnecessary or lengthy detention is a problem for due process, and courts
have often found such detention to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2498-99 (2001) (holding that the indefinite detention
of a deportable alien beyond six months without benefit of a judicial hearing is a
denial of due process); see also Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 314 (3d Cir. 2001), in
which a long-term permanent resident of the United States was convicted of
harboring an undocumented alien who was his employee. Id. at 303. After serving
his sentence, Patel was taken into custody by the INS pending a deportation hearing
on the ground that the conviction constituted an “aggravated felony.” Id. Although a
bond hearing was provided, it addressed only whether Patel’s offense was an
“aggravated felony,” which under the statute automatically deprived Patel of an
individual determination of the necessity of his detention. Id. at 303-04. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held the automatic detention provision of the Immigration
Act unconstitutional as applied to Patel. Citing the Supreme Court’s declaration in
Zadvydas that “freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention,
or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due
Process] Clause protects,” id. at 309 (quoting Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2498), the Court
of Appeals held that “mandatory detentions of aliens after they have been found
subject to removal but who have not yet been ordered removed because they are
pursuing their administrative remedies violates their due process rights unless they
have been afforded the opportunity for an individualized hearing at which they can
show that they do not pose a flight risk or danger to the community.” Id. at 314.
277. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1977).
278. USA Patriot Act § 106, 115 Stat. at 277.
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other agencies or individuals to use or transfer such property as he
279
sees fit.
The Attorney General explained the perceived need for this
provision, stating that:
[l]aw enforcement must be able to ‘follow the money’ in order to
identify and neutralize terrorist networks. We need the capacity for
more than a freeze. We must be able to seize. Consistent with the
President’s action yesterday [seizing aspects of identified groups
and individuals allegedly associated with al-Qaida], our proposal
gives law enforcement the ability to seize their terrorist assets.280

As discussed above, however, temporary and permanent aliens in the
United States enjoy the Fifth Amendment right to due process, a
right which encompasses the right to hold personal and real
281
property. The proposition that the President may unilaterally seize
and dispose of such assets with no meaningful judicial review is
constitutionally untenable.
President Bush apparently has used section 106 of the Patriot Act
to order the seizure of the bank accounts and property of suspected
282
terrorist organizations and individuals associated with them.
It is
important to note that the President may invoke the law any time the
United States is engaged in foreign hostilities, or any time the United
283
States is attacked by a foreign national. The terms of the statute do
not grant judicial review for these seizures, and any judicial review of
a determination based on classified information will be conducted ex
284
parte. Although judicial review may be available under section 316

279. Id. The Act further provides that:
all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as,
and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as
the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and
conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held,
used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for
the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may
perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of
these purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).
280. Homeland Defense Testimony, supra note 20.
281. See supra Part I.D (discussing the constitutional rights of non-citizens).
282. See A. Jeff Ifrah et al., Casting a Wide Net, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at 30
(documenting the signing of an Executive Order on September 24, 2001 that
identified twenty-seven people with whom all financial activities with the United
States were prohibited because of their connection with terrorist
activities); see also
Stewart M. Powell & Dan Freedman, Foreign Banks Urged to Freeze the Assets of Terrorists,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 25, 2001, at 1 (threatening foreign banks with
shutdown of their American operations unless they freeze the financial assets of 12
individuals, 11 organizations, 3 charities, and 1 business, all of which were linked to
terrorist activity).
283. USA Patriot Act § 106, 115 Stat. at 278.
284. Id.
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of the Patriot Act, that provision only grants the owners of
confiscated property the right to file federal lawsuits challenging the
285
determination that the property was an asset of suspected terrorists.
That section, moreover, allows for suspension of the Federal Rules of
Evidence if the court determines that compliance with the Federal
286
Rules could jeopardize national security interests.
In other words,
the section allows for more secret evidence, a function which distorts
the idea of a fair trial.
In addition to raising barriers to judicial review and the
introduction of evidence, section 106 of the Patriot Act may also
constitute an unconstitutional bill of attainder in violation of Article I
287
of the Constitution. The Bill of Attainder Clause has not been the
subject of extensive Supreme Court jurisprudence, and its chief
288
treatment is illustrated by three cases: United States v. Brown, United
289
290
States v. Lovett, and Cummings v. Missouri. In each case, the Court
referred to the Bill of Attainder Clause to inform its analysis of the
constitutionality of a legislative action directed against an individual
or group based upon political beliefs. In Cummings, the Court
invalidated a provision of the Missouri constitution requiring any
person holding a position as an officeholder, lawyer, clergyman,
teacher, or corporate officer to take an oath declaring that he had
never been in the service of the Confederate states under the Bill of
291
Attainder Clause. Similarly, in Lovett, the Court invoked the clause
to invalidate an act of Congress prohibiting the payment of any
compensation for government service to three named individuals
292
who had allegedly engaged in subversive activities.
Finally, in
Brown, the Court struck down as a bill of attainder a provision of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 that
allowed for the imposition of criminal penalties on members of the
293
Communist Party serving as officers or employees of a labor union.
Brown contains the Court’s most thorough modern analysis of the
Bill of Attainder clause. In its opinion, the Court discussed the

285. Id. § 316, 115 Stat. at 309.
286. Id.
287. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 323
(1867) (defining a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without a judicial trial). If the punishment is less than death, then the act is a bill of
pains and penalties. Id. Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder
include bills of pains and penalties. Id.
288. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
289. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
290. 71 U.S. 277, 317, 320 (1866).
291. Id.
292. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 313-15.
293. Brown, 381 U.S. at 439-40; see also 29 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV 1958).
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history of the clause at length and attempted to discern the reasons
for its inclusion in the Constitution. It noted that attainders have
been regarded as possessing three chief characteristics: (1) they are
294
directed against specific individuals or discernable groups; (2) they
295
affect the life or property of those targeted; and (3) they amount to
296
legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
The Court further
explained that the legislative act need not be punitive in nature;
rather, prophylactic measures taken against individuals or group
activities based upon their perceived characteristics may also
297
constitute attainders. Therefore, the Bill of Attainder Clause, the
Court concluded, should be understood within a broad historical
context and incorporate the Framers’ intent to bar “legislative
punishment, of any severity, of specifically designated persons or
298
groups.”
In view of the Supreme Court’s concern that the legislature not
usurp the judicial function by targeting specific individuals or groups
for punishment or deterrence, the asset seizure provisions of the
Patriot Act appear to be vulnerable under the Bill of Attainder
Clause. These provisions (1) are directed against a specific group,
i.e., Islamic or pro-Islamic organizations, and (2) create automatic
asset forfeitures of organizations that the President designates as
“terrorist groups,” and (3) afford little or no due process to those
targeted and the subsequent forfeitures.
The chief distinction in the case of the Patriot Act provisions is that
it is not Congress, but the Chief Executive, who nominates the
entities belonging to the disfavored group. However, this is not a
difference of significance. The Supreme Court has made clear that
an attainder is unconstitutional because of the co-opting of the
299
judicial function by the legislature. The fact that the legislature
leaves the specific designation of the organizations that are subject to
seizure to the executive does not cure that critical defect.

294. See id. at 441 (explaining that attainders were devices often resorted to in
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth-century England for dealing with persons
who attempted or threatened to attempt to overthrow the government).
295. See id. (noting that the attainders historically carried with them a “corruption
of blood,” providing that the attained parties’ heirs could not inherit his property).
296. Id. at 441-46. The Court explained that the clause was intended to ensure
that the legislature would not overstep the bounds of its authority and perform the
functions of other departments. Id. at 446.
297. See id. at 458-59 (explaining that English bills of attainder were enacted for
preventive purposes, where the legislature made a judgment most likely based on
past acts and associations that a given person or group was likely to cause trouble).
298. Id. at 447.
299. E.g., id.; Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866).
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VIII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Provisions in the Patriot Act allowing for increased monitoring of
financial transactions and educational records threaten the right of
privacy to which citizens are entitled. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, the common law has established that “specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various
300
guarantees create zones of privacy.”
A. Sections 355 and 356:
Monitoring and Reporting on Citizen Financial Transactions
Sections 355 and 356, along with other provisions of Title III of the
Patriot Act (surnamed the “International Money Laundering and
Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001”), increase the monitoring and
301
reporting obligations of citizens against other citizens. Section 355
allows financial institutions to communicate and document their
suspicions concerning the involvement of current or former
302
employees in “potentially unlawful activity.”
Section 356 requires
securities brokers and dealers to submit reports documenting any
suspicious activity or transactions as defined under 31 U.S.C. § 5318
303
(1994).”
B. Section 358: Amending the Federal Privacy Statute to Allow Disclosure
of Banking Records for “Financial Analysis”
Section 358 of the Patriot Act amends the Right to Financial
304
Privacy Act of 1978 to allow law enforcement authorities to obtain
financial data related to intelligence or counterintelligence activities,
investigations, or analysis in an effort to protect against international
305
terrorism.
Thus, “financial analysis” is now a sufficient basis for
federal authorities to review citizen financial information. A similar
306
amendment is applied to the Fair Credit Reporting Act to require
furnishing credit reports to federal law enforcement agents who
certify that they need the information for that purpose.


300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 355-356, 115 Stat. 272, 324-25 (2001).
Id. § 355, 115 Stat. at 324.
Id.
12 U.S.C.S. § 3412 (1978).
USA Patriot Act § 358, 115 Stat. at 327 (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C.S. § 1681 (1968).
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C. Section 507: Required Disclosure of Educational Records
Congress passed the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
307
(“FERPA”) in 1974 to protect the privacy rights of students and
308
their parents with respect to their educational records. The law was
enacted with the congressional intent of ensuring that school district
practices resulting in unauthorized disclosures do “not invade the
privacy of students or pose any threat of psychological damage to
309
them.”
Previously, FERPA permitted disclosure of educational records to
law enforcement authorities pursuant to a subpoena, based upon
probable cause and a sworn affidavit demonstrating that the
310
information sought was probative of a criminal investigation.
Section 507 of the Patriot Act amended FERPA to require automatic
disclosure of educational records to federal law enforcement
authorities upon an ex parte court order based only upon
certification that the educational records may be relevant to an
investigation of domestic or international terrorism.
This
amendment makes disclosure of educational records the rule, rather
than the exception, permitting federal “sweeps” of the educational
records of certain groups of persons, notably aliens residing in the
United States on student visas.
D. Building Biometric Databases of Citizens
311

312

313

Sections 405, 414, and 1008 of the Patriot Act require the
Attorney General to explore the feasibility of using “biometric
identification systems,” or fingerprinting, at U.S. ports of entry, such
as customs offices at airports and harbors. The provisions also allow
this identification to be used for issuing passports and visas, as well as
other secure information systems, such as bar code identifiers that
will “interface” with other law enforcement agencies to identify and
detain individuals who may pose a threat to national security.


307. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g (1974)
308. Id. § 1232g(a)(1)(c).
309. Amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974).
310. Id.
311. Id. § 405, 115 Stat. at 345.
312. Id. § 414, 115 Stat. at 353-54.
313. Id. § 1008, 115 Stat. at 355.
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CONCLUSION
The September 11th attacks have challenged American society in
ways that are unprecedented. A strong military and law enforcement
response is necessary to answer that challenge. But to view these acts
of terrorism as principally a military strike for strategic purposes, like
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, would be a mistake. The
extremists who perpetrated the attacks did not want to simply destroy
American landmarks of industry and government, they wanted to
destroy America as America, to demolish the foundations upon which
American culture and freedom, and all they represent to the world,
are built. To set aside the lessons of over two hundred years of
American freedom, enshrined in the Declaration of Independence,
as a commitment to the truth that “All men are created equal [and]
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights . . . life,
314
liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” as politically or practically
inexpedient in a time of “war,” would be to allow the extremists to
win by surrendering who we are as a nation. If the American people
accept a form of police statism in the name of a promise of personal
security, that would be the greatest defeat imaginable.


314. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

